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Abstract
We regroup the main types of global development finance 
into three clusters: concessional public finance (including 
domestic taxes), public borrowing on market-related terms, 
and private finance. We look at the main purposes they 
can be used for, and their interdependence. We consider 
the global outlook for capital markets, the determinants 
of country creditworthiness and why grant aid should 
be prioritised for less creditworthy countries. We suggest 
that financing plans for most of the new Sustainable 
Development Goals should be developed at the country 
level rather than globally, so that key trade-offs can be 
fully explored. We look at specific policies to unlock access 
to private sector participation in five key areas – including 
social services. We introduce a Market Aid Index to help 
track donor engagement with the private sector.
We investigate how a country’s mix of development 
finance changes as it grows – the so-called ‘missing 
middle’ dilemma. We find that public resources overall 
fall continuously until a country is well into middle-
income status, as international assistance falls faster than 
tax revenues rise. Static per capita income thresholds 
are becoming increasingly unreliable guides to resource 
allocation. We look at alternative groupings, especially 
taking into account fiscal capacity, creditworthiness and 
vulnerability.
 We assess the recent literature on trade-offs between 
rapid growth and climate change mitigation imperatives. 
We examine the geography of public climate finance, which 
is intrinsically different from that of development aid, and 
the lack of a credible ‘additionality’ test for funding the 
former over and above the latter. We therefore consider 
how the limited public grant element so far available 
should best be rationed, to limit the scope for distortions.
We revisit the role of the multilateral development 
banks’ market-related windows, in view of the missing 
middle problem. We consider what factors underpin 
their secular stagnation, and how to overcome them. We 
summarise other specific international reform options in 
response to our analysis, on private sector contributions, 
market-related lending and climate finance. We conclude 
by contrasting two alternative world views: (1) making 
international public finance a complement to private 
finance everywhere, and (2) deliberately focusing public 
stakes where the private sector is not present. We suggest a 
way forward.
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Glossary of development finance terms
Concessional Assistance: official public support on terms 
that can run from 100% grant to marginally better than 
market loan rates, and anywhere in between. We use it here 
to refer to the grant end of the spectrum, as distinct from 
market-related public borrowing (below).
Concessional Public Finance: our term, combining 
domestic tax revenues and concessional assistance.
International Public Finance (IPF): a recently introduced 
umbrella term, combining (1) all development cooperation, 
very broadly defined, and (2) official international 
support for other primary public purposes, such as export 
promotion and climate change mitigation. Both can be 
supplied on more or less concessional terms, as above.
Market-Related Public Borrowing: loans, in this paper 
mostly at the harder end of the concessional spectrum, 
taken or guaranteed by sovereign borrowers in developing 
countries. The lenders are mostly public bodies, such as 
MDBs, export credit agencies and sovereign borrowing on 
commercial terms from banks and capital markets. Their 
rates should, and generally do, compare favourably to the 
lowest market yield at which the borrower can place its 
bonds or syndicated private loans.
Official Development Assistance (ODA): The set 
of standards adopted by members of the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) for counting 
development ‘aid’, also used for voluntary reporting by 
some other countries. Includes a country eligibility list, 
rules for scoring development-related expenditure within 
donor countries, and thresholds for the inclusion of 
concessional loans. All three elements are under review and 
changes are expected shortly.
Official Finance (OF): Our term for global, UN-based 
tracking of OOF-like flows (see below) from all sources 
and purposes, whether they agree with ODA (and other 
DAC) definitions or not. Inclusion is subject only to the test 
that financial terms plausibly improve on the best market 
alternative available. 
Other Official Flows (OOF): The face value, under 
current ODA definitions, of official loans reported to the 
DAC that do not qualify for ODA, either because they fail 
the ODA concessionality test or because they assert other 
primary purposes than development. 
Private Finance for Development (PFFD): Private 
financial flows directly associated with a significant public 
investment (concessional or market-related), including 
through equity stakes, loans, and guarantees and related 
instruments.
Total Official Support for Development (TOSD): A new 
aggregate recently proposed by the DAC, to capture most 
of IPF which would not qualify for ODA under its new 
definition as above. In particular, assuming that revised 
ODA counts only the grant equivalent of loans, TOSD 
would score the difference between that element and their 
face value (hence OOF would disappear as a separate 
category in DAC reporting). 
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Executive summary 
This report looks ahead to major UN-hosted international 
meetings on development finance in 2015 and beyond, 
and is intended as a briefing for officials, advisors, 
commentators shaping the agenda there. Of some 190 
countries attending, perhaps 30 have long been, and will 
likely remain, chronic ‘donors’ through 2030, and up to 
another 30 are likely to remain chronically ‘aid’-dependent 
through that horizon. However, a whopping 130 or more 
fit into neither category: if that crushing majority is not 
convinced they have a real stake in the proposals put 
forward, nothing of lasting value will occur. 
 The paper builds upon a large body of recent literature 
on how the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
should best be framed, delivered and, in particular, 
funded, focusing on developing countries. It identifies a 
few key pressure points on which additional international 
action is both desirable and realistic. Our premise is that 
governments have relatively little control over the private 
actors who will largely determine the pace of progress 
toward the SDGs: they have influence of course, but must 
use that effectively and consistently.
It acknowledges, but does not repeat, much of the 
‘policy coherence’ or ‘means of implementation’ debate. 
Policies and finance can be both complements and 
substitutes in achieving goals. However, too much rhetoric 
on what developing countries should do for themselves 
can distract attention from the necessary contributions of 
advanced countries, whether in terms of their own policies 
or the resources they need to deploy. ‘Where is the money?’ 
remains a revealing enough question in its own right, even 
if answering it is far from sufficient to achieve the SDGs. 
Our main concern is also not with either public finance 
or private finance taken individually, but in the interplay 
between them, and how to make the most of their relative 
strengths.
Our analysis starts with the helpful, though not 
airtight, grouping of development spending needs used 
by the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on 
Sustainable Development Financing (ICESDF) into those 
relating mainly to: (1) basic needs and social progress; (2) 
infrastructure for sustainable development; and (3) global 
public goods, under which heading we consider mostly 
climate change mitigation here. We also share ICESDF’s 
perspective that global public and private savings should 
be sufficient in aggregate to meet the needs for all three 
categories of investment, especially in a globally favourable 
capital markets setting. However, some current financing 
and investment patterns will need to change, and this 
shaping will not occur spontaneously. 
We group (Figure 1 below) the types of finance available 
to developing countries also into three: (a) concessional 
public finance; (b) market-related public borrowing; 
and (c) private finance. The first category includes both 
domestic tax revenue and international concessional 
assistance (see Glossary). The second includes developing 
government borrowing on market-related terms from 
public and private intermediaries, with a special emphasis 
on terms that improve significantly on the best available 
market offer. The third includes all other private finance. 
We use this particular combination to highlight the 
links between domestic taxes and aid, as well as the role 
of public borrowing on market-related terms in a global 
environment of low real interest rates. We choose not to 
differentiate between domestic and international private 
finance. The policies to mobilise private finance and the 
potential interactions with public finance are similar in 
both cases.
We take a country perspective, considering 
creditworthiness and fiscal capacity, in particular, as 
critical overlays to the increasingly unhelpful income-based 
classifications that still dominate many development aid 
allocation rules. This perspective also spotlights the need 
for assistance for rule-of-law improvements as a route 
towards opening up greater financial market access. And 
it strengthens the case for giving special consideration 
to least developed countries (LDC) and small island 
developing states (SIDS), classifications which are also 
strong predictors of low creditworthiness.
We look at funding sources available to countries at 
different stages of their growth. We find a clear ‘missing 
middle’ pattern, whereby just as many countries start to 
emerge from very low income, their growth is constrained 
as domestic taxes and foreign private and market-related 
public borrowing all fail to expand fast enough (and some 
to expand at all) to compensate for concessional assistance. 
Concessional 
public finance
Market-Related 
public borrowing
Private 
finance
Infrastructure 
for sustainable 
development
Basic needs and 
social progress
Global 
public goods
Figure 1. Finance flows and development goals
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The latter simply falls too quickly in relation to desirable 
public development investments. 
 The inclusion of global public goods centre-stage in 
the new SDG framework calls for another major set of 
adjustments to development policies and programmes that 
have traditionally taken single countries as their main, if 
not sole, reference point. 
The key case in point is climate change mitigation, 
which unlike adaptation is a global, as well as regional, 
public good. We endorse recent analyses emphasising the 
synergies at global level, or conversely the lack of major 
trade-offs, between switching to resilient national growth 
pathways and eradicating absolute poverty. Nonetheless, a 
significant subset of very poor countries lacking financial 
market access could rationally take a different view, based 
on higher discount rates than those prevailing globally, on 
their critical investment choices. We also draw attention to 
the geography of public mitigation finance, sourced largely 
from aid budgets so far, but which, unlike the geography 
of development aid, is heavily skewed toward emerging 
economies that are large carbon emitters. 
 Given the sheer scale of climate mitigation investment 
needs, the broadly favourable capital market context and 
the negligible impact of all but a handful of developing 
countries on the global carbon footprint, grant aid for 
climate change should be reserved as far as possible for 
adaptation. This is to preclude diversion of grants to 
middle-income countries, in the likely event that large-scale 
‘new and additional’ concessional assistance resources are 
not in fact raised for mitigation for some years to come. 
Adaptation funding should meanwhile continue to target 
those most vulnerable to climate change, notably LDCs 
and SIDS, for whom we propose a new international 
threshold of 50% of public concessional adaptation 
assistance. To the extent that grants are provided for 
mitigation, they should be used for demonstration 
purposes in less developed/less creditworthy countries, with 
market-related publicly intermediated loans, at current low 
interest rates, leveraging private resources for the rest.
The two strands of our analysis, country-based priorities 
and global public goods, therefore converge towards 
the following recommendations: (1) for concessional 
assistance, redirect this finite resource towards less 
creditworthy countries, which have relatively more need 
for it and where it could over time help unlock market 
access; (2) for market-related public borrowing, raise 
far more of it, especially through the multilateral banks 
(MDBs) that are under-serving some key constituencies; 
and (3) for private finance, level the playing field, reduce 
distortions across uses and unblock regulatory obstacles 
to wider access. This third track calls for policy changes 
as well as blending of public and private funds in specific 
projects and partnerships.
There remains a final underlying tension to be resolved 
in the deployment of scarce public international finance, 
between the polar options of (a) spreading it very thinly 
and widely in systematic association with private flows, or 
instead (b) resolutely concentrating only on contexts and 
uses where private flows are absent or grossly insufficient. 
We suggest that grant-heavy assistance be concentrated on 
the least creditworthy countries, but used within them as 
far as possible to enable or crowd in other flows.
Finally, we suggest a few modest and targeted 
institutional improvements, starting with a more joined-up 
approach to using the balance sheets of the MDBs, but also 
better metrics and targets for market-related official finance 
(OF) and for leveraging the private sector, including via 
guarantees. We illustrate the latter problem with a crude 
‘index of market aid’ comparing the extent that different 
bilateral programmes engage with the private sector today.
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Summary of recommendations
• Boost	market-related	lending	by	MDBs. • Independently	review	demand	for	market-related	MDB	financing.
• Leverage	receivables	of	concessional	windows.
• Smoothen	graduation	from	concessional	to	market-related	windows.
• Improve	competitiveness	of	MDB	delivery.
• Boost	access	to	market-related	public	finance	more
generally.
• Agree	on	a	new	international	indicator	for	‘official	finance’	(OF).
• Set	a	new	UN-agreed target	for	OF.
• Incentivise	private	finance	and	align	it	with	development
objectives.
• Establish	basic	metrics	for	private	finance	for	development	(PFFD).
• Recognise	undisbursed	guarantees	and	other	contingent	finance.
• Minimise	allocation	distortions	inherent	in	public	climate
mitigation	finance.
• Finance	mitigation	mainly	on	market-related	loan	terms,	with	grants	for	demonstration
programmes	in	less	creditworthy	countries.
• Establish	a	new	floor	of	50%	for	the	share	of	concessional	assistance	for	adaptation	going	to
LDCs	and	SIDS.
• Balance	public-private	roles	across	and	within	countries. • Prioritise	concessional	assistance	across	countries	to	the	least	creditworthy,	with	lowest	tax
capacity	and	greatest	vulnerability.
• Within	these	countries,	crowd	in	private	actors	via	partnerships	and	rule-of-law	support.
• Mobilise	far	more	market-related	public	finance,	and	encourage	greater	leverage	of	private
finance	in	specific	sectors,	in	countries	with	good	market	access.
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Introduction
This report looks ahead to major international meetings 
in 2015 and beyond and is addressed to actors shaping 
the agenda there. It aims to identify a limited menu 
of recommendations for change that could be agreed 
collectively at those meetings. Finding space for agreement 
among 190-plus countries, of which the vast majority 
do not self-identify with terms like ‘donor’ or ‘recipient’, 
will not be easy. It builds on a burgeoning literature1 that 
converges on a likely new set of international Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) and asks what must be done to 
implement them, including how best to fund them. 
It tries to boil down the complexity and interdependence 
of these questions to a few key pressure points on which 
action at the international level is both desirable and 
realistic, in a multipolar world relying largely on the 
limited prospects for consensus decision-making among 
governments. There is an equally limited ability of 
governments to shape incentives to drive the actions of 
private businesses and households, where most of the real 
actors are.
It is aimed at generalist policy-makers and delegates 
and the wider community of practitioners, commentators 
and analysts who stand behind them. It does not presume 
specialist knowledge. Where our findings rely on our 
own empirical work, our methods are explained as far as 
possible in annexes or boxes so as to keep the narrative 
flowing.
We use the term ‘roadmap’ to refer to the pathways 
between three clusters of funding sources and three types 
of development finance, as summarised below. We also 
differentiate between country contexts, especially in terms 
of their varied access to market-based finance. We call this 
map ‘rough’ because it is simplified, for sure. Some may 
find it grossly oversimplified: we make no apologies on this 
account. The true landscape out there is multidimensional 
and constantly changing. We hope readers will be able 
to fill in some of the relevant extensions and updates for 
themselves, starting from this stylised base.
 A second warning is in order. We understand how 
improved policies (domestic and international) can be 
close substitutes for, as well as complements to, additional 
finance. This is particularly true with respect to the 
effectiveness and efficiency of public spending. So we 
acknowledge the huge ‘Policy Coherence’ or ‘Means of 
Implementation’ agendas, going well beyond finance, and 
indeed as key enablers of finance.
Nonetheless, we devote relatively less space to these 
agendas here than do others we cite, partly to avoid 
repeating advice that is sound but not readily actionable. 
We also believe too much global emphasis on what 
developing countries could or should do for themselves 
is intrusive and unproductive, especially if it is seen as 
deflecting attention from the contributions of others, 
in cash or policy change from their side. Finally, we 
suggest that ‘finding the money’ is an important enough 
consideration in its own right, though of course far from 
sufficient by itself to reach any given goal, let alone the 
whole set.
Report structure
Section 1 looks at the three main components of global 
development finance, the purposes they can be used for 
and their interdependence, across different country types 
and areas for investment. This section also considers the 
favourable global outlook for capital markets, which 
powerfully shifts investors’ calculus, including in favour 
of green technology. It examines the determinants of 
country creditworthiness and why and how aid should 
be prioritised to less creditworthy countries, many of 
which are least developed countries (LDCs) and small 
island developing states (SIDS). We return to country 
classifications, and especially tax capacity, in Section 3.
Section 2 argues that costing and financing plans 
for the new SDGs should be developed at the country 
level rather than globally, so that key trade-offs across 
objectives and funding types can be fully explored. It looks 
at policies to unlock access to private sector participation 
in five key sectors. It reminds us of the importance of 
reducing volatility for both private and public flows. And 
it introduces a Market Aid Index to help track donor 
engagement with the private sector, illustrating how 
difficult it is to measure inputs of public support to the 
private sector consistently – let alone its impact.
Section 3 concludes our analysis of changing 
country-based needs. We look at how a country’s mix of 
development finance changes as it grows – the so-called 
‘missing middle’ dilemma. Overall public resources 
fall initially, as aid falls faster than tax revenues rise, 
and private international flows do not close the gap 
at lower-middle income levels. This also flags the 
chronic inadequacy of market-related official lending to 
‘graduating’ countries. Static per capita income thresholds 
are becoming increasingly unreliable guides to resource 
allocation. We look at alternative groupings, especially 
taking into account fiscal capacity and vulnerability, as 
well as creditworthiness, as above.
Section 4 moves from country-based development 
approaches to how they will have to adjust to the SDGs’ 
global imperatives. It revisits, as a critical illustration of 
this adjustment, the debate on trade-offs between rapid 
growth and mitigation imperatives. It likewise reviews the 
geography of public climate finance, which is intrinsically 
different from that of development aid, and probes the 
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limits of the ‘additionality’ question. It considers how 
the limited concessional public finance available (so far) 
should best be rationed, consistent with our approach 
above on creditworthiness and the residual case for public 
intervention in markets.
Section 5 revisits the role of the multilateral 
development banks (MDBs), and in particular their 
‘harder’ or market-related windows, in terms of what their 
contribution to the missing middle dilemma has been, and 
may yet be. It considers what factors underpin their secular 
stagnation, and how to overcome them.
Section 6 summarises four specific areas of international 
reform that are judged both targeted and feasible, based on 
the analysis of the preceding sections. In addition to MDB 
systemic reform, they include: a new metric and target for 
market-related lending; better metrics for private finance 
mobilised by deliberate public action; and limits of the use 
of concessional assistance for climate change mitigation in 
creditworthy countries, along with specific preferences for 
LDCs and SIDS for adaptation.
Section 7 concludes by contrasting two mutually 
incompatible world views: (1) make international public 
finance a complement to private finance everywhere, and 
(2) deliberately focus public stakes only where the private 
sector is not present. We suggest a pragmatic way forward.
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Summary: 
We consider the three main types of development 
finance, the purposes they can be used for and their 
interdependence. Of these, the international component of 
concessional public finance remains the most valuable for 
developing countries, in that it has the fewest trade-offs 
and is potentially the most flexible in use. This section 
also considers the global outlook for capital markets, 
which we expect to remain liquid and low cost for the 
next decade or more. This outlook encourages investment 
activity in general and especially for those investments 
with higher upfront costs and longer-term benefits (such 
as renewable energy). We also suggest that more countries 
will have regular access to commercial private finance. 
The section then examines the determinants of country 
creditworthiness and the reasons why aid should be 
prioritised to less creditworthy countries (for which the 
LDCs and SIDS categories prove to be good predictors) 
and targeted at improving their market access over time 
through rule-of-law improvements.
The three main elements of  
global development finance
The Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on 
Sustainable Development Financing (ICESDF) usefully 
broke down development finance into four components, 
consisting of domestic and international, public and private 
finance. We regroup them into three: (1) concessional 
public finance (grant assistance and taxes), (2) public 
borrowing on market-related terms (with a particular focus 
on loans from public institutions on better-than-market 
terms), and (3) private finance (see Figure 1 and Glossary).
We do this mainly, first, to draw attention to the 
synergies between taxes and aid; second, to highlight the 
underutilised potential of public loans on ‘harder’ terms 
in a favourable global capital market context. We do not 
differentiate between international and domestic private 
finance, as both the policies to help mobilise them and their 
interactions with public finance are broadly similar.
Concessional public finance 
The domestic public revenue component (taxes and 
royalties) that concessional assistance seeks to supplement 
has grown rapidly overall because of the acceleration of 
the tax base in developing countries (general economic 
growth). Furthermore, in many low-income countries 
(LICs), growth has been jump-started by natural resource 
extraction, and these projects make a particularly large 
contribution to public revenues. Given likely exploitation 
of new mineral discoveries, these revenues will continue 
to expand as long as commodity prices do not fall 
precipitously. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
identifies twenty resource-rich economies in sub-Saharan 
Africa (those where resources account for over a quarter of 
total exports) and half of these are also fiscally dependent 
on natural resources (resource revenue more than 20% 
of total revenues). The issues are managing the volatility 
and sustainability of these revenues over time to avoid the 
resource curse (Lundgren et al., 2013).
The concessional assistance component of concessional 
public financing has also grown significantly, in absolute 
terms at least. Concessional assistance or more loosely, aid 
(in the sense of grants in particular) has a special place in 
financing development as it is the only revenue source with 
minimal economic trade-offs. Unlike raising taxes, aid does 
not cut profits and growth in recipient countries. Unlike 
international or domestic borrowing, grant aid does not 
create future debt problems. Unlike remittances, aid can 
potentially be spent directly on important public goods 
like police, judiciary and public administration. To most 
effectively achieve its objectives, aid can be channelled 
through government, non-governmental agencies or 
businesses, and it can be targeted at groups and areas 
that may not easily be able to attract other funding (even 
redistribution via the tax system, which has inherent 
limits). It is, therefore, potentially the most valuable of all 
sources of development finance from the perspective of the 
recipient government, assuming of course that donors and 
governments behave accountably and effectively and do 
not restrict aid’s flexibility through unnecessary earmarks.
Concessional assistance (grant aid and concessional 
loans) from all donors spent in developing countries 
(so-called country programmable aid, CPA) rose from $63 
billion in 2000 to $93 billion in 2012. But CPA to least 
developed countries (LDCs) and other LICs more than 
doubled (from $19.4 billion to $40.4 billion), while aid to 
upper-middle-income countries (UMICs) actually declined 
slightly. Aid to lower-middle-income countries (LMICs) 
was broadly static, though not keeping up with population 
growth. Thus, the growth of aid to LICs has come about 
from a reallocation of aid away from relatively richer 
countries as well as from an expansion in the overall level 
of aid. Each factor has been equally important. Looking 
ahead, prospects for substantial additional CPA are not 
promising, but the continued rapid graduation of many 
developing countries out of LIC and LMIC categories does 
imply that a process of reallocating aid towards LICs can 
provide a reasonable growth of aid for those countries 
most in need.
The principles that should guide this reallocation of 
aid are currently being debated. Broadly speaking, the 
principles drive two decisions: whether and how to allocate 
aid across countries (with income level being the dominant 
Section 1: Global development finance
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variable currently used – at least in theory – together 
with additional focus on fragile states, LDCs, SIDS and 
historical relationships or friendships); and the purposes 
to which aid should be put. Aid has always been construed 
as primarily for development, now broadly interpreted to 
include global public goods like climate change mitigation, 
which affect both developing and advanced countries. 
However, some activities with significant development 
purposes, like peacekeeping or guarantees, are not today 
fully counted as aid, while other activities with little 
impact on poor countries’ development, like scholarships 
and refugee costs in donor countries, are counted. These 
two issues, of country and purpose allocation, are linked. 
If aid were allocated more to climate change mitigation 
than to primary education, for example, it would also go 
more towards large middle-income-countries (because 
of the size and structure of their economies and public 
service coverage) as compared to fragile states and LICs. 
Below, we argue that a dynamic reallocation of aid 
using a creditworthiness criterion would be a useful new 
instrument to consider.
Public borrowing
The second leg of this stool of development finance is 
public borrowing on market-related terms. This comes 
mainly from bilateral and multilateral development 
banks and agencies, especially on better-than-market 
terms, but it also includes regular syndicated loans and 
sovereign bond issues, on domestic and/or international 
markets. Many developing countries have fiscal space 
to borrow more as a consequence of rapid growth in 
gross domestic product (GDP) and exports, a build-up of 
foreign exchange reserves, improvements in the rule of 
law, and sound macroeconomic policy with low rates of 
inflation. Several have also benefited from debt relief. But 
there have been constraints on the supply side of MDBs 
and other official lending agencies (see Section 5), so this 
pillar of the international financial architecture has been 
stagnant since the early 1980s in nominal terms. The debt 
crises of many countries in the 1980s and 1990s have led 
to the application of credit rationing based on the results 
of a mechanical Debt Sustainability Framework model 
that may be excessively restrictive by not differentiating 
between capital and recurrent public spending, and the 
corresponding multipliers, for example. In fact, over time, 
it is LMICs (the second lowest quintile of countries) that 
have both received the lowest levels of capital inflows and 
registered the least rapid growth of GDP per capita. Aid 
cut-offs as countries become richer seem to have significant 
consequences for growth and development (Galiani et al., 
2014). This issue appears to be most serious in the second 
quintile of developing countries (Table 1). We analyse this 
further in Section 3.
Private finance
The third leg, of domestic and international private 
finance, has grown rapidly in aggregate volume, and many 
more countries are destinations as well as sources of these 
funds. While definitions of what to include in private 
international finance vary (for example, remittances can 
be classified either as private philanthropy or as a factor 
export), it is safe to say that private finance has gone 
from an insignificant feature of the financing of LICs to 
a dominant feature. In fact, 12 LICs receive more from 
foreign direct investment (FDI) than from aid. Of course, 
private financing does not automatically have sustainable 
development objectives at its heart, with safeguards for 
social and environmental impacts, but it does provide 
jobs, growth and economic opportunities when allowed 
to operate in a well-regulated and relatively undistorted 
environment. A priority is the provision of incentives 
or regulations so that private businesses contribute to 
sustainable development outcomes to the maximum 
potential in major sectors like extractives, infrastructure, 
agriculture, banking and social impact investing. And when 
substantial private inflows relax the balance of payments 
constraint facing a country, it is easier for the public sector 
to increase expenditures through running moderately 
higher deficits without facing a high risk of an exchange 
rate crisis.
What should development finance be used for?
The three core purposes for which development finance 
is required are described by ICESDF as (1) financing for 
basic needs related to ending poverty and hunger, (2) 
financing for sustainable development investments, notably 
infrastructure, energy, resilience and rural development, 
and (3) financing for global and national public goods.
Table 1. Real GDP per capita growth 1960-2010 by quintiles of 
initial income distribution
Mean real GDP per 
capita growth 1960-
2010 (percent per year)
Standard 
deviation
Number of 
countries
Poorest quintile 2.2 2.0 22
Second quintile 0.9 1.5 22
Third quintile 2.0 1.6 22
Fourth quintile 2.4 1.2 22
Richest quintile 2.1 0.6 22
Source: Penn World Tables Version 7.0.
Note:  Table 1 reports summary statistics on average growth performance 
from 1960 to 2010 for 110 countries, grouped by quintiles of the initial 
income distribution in 1960, updating calculations by Easterly (2006). 
Table reproduced from Table 1 in Kraay and McKenzie (2014).
14 Financing the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals
In each category, there is significant under-funding, in 
the sense that desirable development spending on projects 
and programmes that yield marginal benefits greater than 
marginal costs is not yet undertaken. ICESDF concludes 
that ‘it is clear that current financing and investment 
patterns will not deliver sustainable development’. In 
discussing the potential for additional financing, ICESDF 
also notes the interdependence between various financing 
streams. As examples, domestic public finance can be 
helped by targeted support in the form of capacity-
building through aid (international public finance) or by 
the increased revenues associated with economic growth 
generated by FDI; private finance, both domestic and 
international, can be catalysed by aid in public-private 
partnerships and other mechanisms.
Each component of external financing has its own 
characteristics and drivers, but increasingly there are 
substantial interdependencies among them, resulting 
from a changing context of global development and 
finance. Financing needs and challenges are highly context 
specific, but structural changes have altered the nature of 
developing countries’ needs.
Most developing countries have had significant success 
in raising tax revenues for their own public expenditures. 
But there are still shortfalls in basic needs spending (mostly 
within LICs), with 31 countries spending less than $200 
(2011 purchasing power parity, PPP) per person per year 
on health, education and other public services. Partly, this 
is because governments tend to provide more collective 
goods (administration, defence, public order and safety, 
environmental protection) at early stages of development 
before turning to service delivery. For a typical country 
in Africa, public services comprise half of government 
recurrent spending.
Gaps in public investments for sustainable development 
(mostly within MICs) are also sizeable. Despite both 
enthusiasm for, and some controversy over, infrastructure 
public-private partnerships, two thirds of infrastructure 
financing comes from public sector treasuries 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2012). Even in advanced countries, 
over half of infrastructure is financed by governments.
It is not self-evident, however, that there is abundant 
global funding potentially available for the SDGs, even 
before discussing under what conditions it gets allocated 
for the ‘right’ balance of purposes and countries. So we 
next discuss the foreseeable capital markets context into 
which the SDGs will be launched.
A benign outlook for global  
savings mobilization
Structurally, it appears that global capital markets are 
entering a protracted period of high liquidity, low cost and 
a modest risk premium which could last a decade or more, 
even with a tapering of quantitative easing policies. The 
‘secular stagnation’ theory that has gained considerable 
traction can be reframed as an environment where 
negative real interest rates are required to equate saving 
and investment and permit full employment (Teulings and 
Baldwin, 2014). These features favour developing countries 
that have, as suggested above, substantial needs for higher 
spending and accelerating aggregate demand.
Analytically, the levels of real interest rates depends 
on saving, investment and the supply of and demand for 
risk-free assets. Recent developments in each of these three 
components suggest that low (or negative) real rates can be 
expected to continue for several years, albeit with risks of 
instability (see Box 1).
Global saving is rising because an aging population 
in advanced economies is trying to accumulate funds to 
ensure adequate consumption into the future (Loayza et 
al., 2000). Meanwhile, the average saving rate in emerging 
and developing countries has also risen, from 23% to 33% 
of GDP between 1990 and 2010, although much of this 
rise was concentrated in China.
At the same time, investment has dipped below 20% 
of GDP in advanced economies since the Great Recession, 
reflecting the continued gap between potential and actual 
output growth, and has only expanded in developing 
countries in line with savings (Lagarde, 2014). In 
addition, the IMF has highlighted the constraints posed by 
inadequate infrastructure as an obstacle to further private 
investments and growth.
The supply and demand for risk-free assets also suggests 
low levels of equilibrium real interest rates. The supply 
of global risk-free assets has been cut by half, with e.g. 
Spanish and Italian government bonds as well as asset 
and mortgage backed securities no longer qualifying. 
Meanwhile, regulators have forced banks, insurance 
companies and pension funds to increase their holdings of 
risk-free assets for prudential reasons. The result: higher 
prices and lower real interest rates on risk-free financial 
assets.
It is because of the potential that exists for many more 
developing countries (and official aid agencies) to tap into 
global capital markets at relatively low real rates that 
hybrid financing structures – linking grant aid or non-
concessional lending from international finance institutions 
(IFIs) with tax money and with private commercial 
funds in public-private partnerships – have become so 
attractive. Such structures are still emerging, but offer 
the best prospect for financing sustainable development 
and infrastructure investments in the post-2015 period. 
We explore some of the institutional reforms that would 
facilitate this further in Section 5.
Another implication of a relatively long period of low 
real interest rates is that it justifies, through a standard 
financial cost-benefit lens (let alone social discounting), 
investment profiles with a relatively heavier upfront cost 
and long tails of lower operating costs. These profiles 
typically apply to renewable energy sources, for example, 
that have become financially cheaper relative to more 
A rough roadmap 15 
Box 1. The impact of low global interest rates on developing and emerging economies 
 • Nominal interest rates could rise with inflation even if real interest rates remain low or negative. It is, however, 
unlikely that inflation will increase significantly in the medium term. Commodity prices are falling as more 
supply comes on stream and wage growth is stagnant. Inflation is below both the policy target and the long-
term expected rate in most advanced economies. Until output is able to return to its potential, an increase in 
inflation from the current average of about 1.5% will be slow (IMF, 2014a).
 • Long periods of low or negative real interest rates could trigger asset bubbles. Indeed, there is speculation and 
controversy as to whether this is already under way – US auto loans, London and Chinese property, gold and 
art have ‘bubbly’ aspects. Given the damage caused by the sub-prime bubble in the United States, central banks 
had considered the wisdom of using monetary policy in a pre-emptive way to address asset bubbles, but this 
view does not seem to have gained much traction. Chair Janet Yellen of the US Federal Reserve has argued 
that macro prudential regulations should be used instead, keeping the focus of monetary policy on inflation, 
unemployment and the output gap (Yellen, 2014).
 • Notwithstanding this benign environment for global interest rates, there is a concern that volatility in private 
flows could be destabilising for developing countries. Already, a ‘fragile five’ (Brazil, India, Turkey, Indonesia, 
South Africa) has been identified as potentially vulnerable, but the consensus view is that this vulnerability 
stems as much from domestic macroeconomic policy management as from global instability. Indeed, foreign 
investors increasingly hold local currency denominated bonds in developing countries, and almost 80% of 
government debt is funded through local financing (IMF, 2014b). Maturities are also lengthening as long-term 
pension funds and insurance assets in developing countries have now reached over $5.5 trillion (Canuto, 2014).
 • Of course, instability in private capital flows could also arise from a systemic crisis in the global financial 
market, but this threat is receding. The introduction of the Single Rulebook, the Single Supervision Mechanism 
and the Single Resolution Mechanism in the eurozone lessens the potential systemic risk from a eurozone 
bank failure (EC, 2014), but the risk that a large ‘too-big-to-fail’ bank could trigger another crisis cannot yet 
be disregarded. From the perspective of developing countries, few of whom are represented in the Financial 
Stability Board, the issue of international prudential regulations is too important to be left simply to G20 and 
a few other members and international organizations. Providing them with greater voice, including through 
enhanced discussions in the FSB’s regional consultative groups, is needed
 • Similarly, the changes in capital adequacy, liquidity standards, and systemic risk and interconnectedness 
introduced by Basel III should reduce risk-taking by banks across the world. There is some danger that this 
could prejudice the willingness of banks to lend for investment projects in developing countries – Basel III 
gives incentives to banks to issue mortgages and short-term loans rather than long-term corporate and project 
finance loans, although there is no clear evidence that one type of lending is more risky than the other (G30, 
2013). A number of policy changes could help restore a level playing field to long-term finance, such as creating 
new long-term investment intermediaries, developing domestic debt and equity capital markets, and removing 
regulatory biases towards short-term lending.
carbon-intensive technology in the current global capital 
market environment. We turn to this topic in Section 4.
 However, the mere availability of savings and liquidity 
at global level by no means guarantees easy and regular 
access to them by all developing countries, let alone on 
terms they consider accessible or sustainable. We turn to 
this question now.
Creditworthiness and access to private  
capital markets: how to improve it
Seventy-four developing countries now have a credit 
rating that allows them to borrow in international 
capital markets. Twenty-one developing countries have 
an investment grade rating. For any developing country 
government, the benefit of receiving a grant or other form 
of public international finance can be thought of relative to 
the next-best alternative, namely borrowing from capital 
markets (put another way, the benefit to a recipient country 
government of a one-dollar grant is the shadow price of 
foreign exchange). The less the access to capital markets 
and the higher the cost, the greater is the value to the 
recipient country government of a grant or a concessional 
public sector loan.
Some developing countries have taken advantage of 
high liquidity in global capital markets to issue long-term 
bonds – Ghana, Senegal and Zambia have all issued bonds 
at interest rates of 800 basis points or more, suggesting 
they have high shadow prices for foreign exchange. The 
history of these ventures has not been good: Standard 
and Poor’s reported that about half of all developing 
countries issuing bonds between 1980 and 2000 had at 
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least one debt crisis episode (Jahjah and Yue, 2004). It 
would be preferable for these countries to be able to access 
more concessional assistance and public market-related 
lending facilities, which are able to transfer funds at far 
lower rates. For example, current International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) rates for 10-year 
flexible spread loans have an interest rate of just 0.73% 
(0.33% London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) rate plus 
0.4% spread), far lower than the rates countries are paying 
in global capital markets. In Section 5 we ask whether 
some countries are voluntarily making this seemingly 
irrational choice to borrow from capital markets rather 
than official multilateral banks, or whether they are being 
forced into it.
In the current (relatively) benign environment for 
global capital, grant-heavy official development assistance 
(ODA) should be focused on those countries that have 
little access to, or face high costs in, private capital markets 
(Kharas, forthcoming). This kind of allocation rule would 
give greater emphasis to LDCs and SIDS compared to the 
commonly used alternative allocation rule focusing largely 
on prioritising lower per capita income levels. It would 
also favour those economies that have yet to jump-start 
rapid growth, and countries with high external or domestic 
government debt.
The analysis (Kharas) also finds that variation between 
countries  in terms of the rule of law is among the most 
important determinants of their access to private capital 
markets. This suggests a priority should be placed on 
reforms in this area.
Another alternative is for developing country 
governments to tap their own financial markets by raising 
domestic debt. This avoids the problems with foreign 
exchange mismatches that have caused or aggravated many 
external debt crises. Until recently, these domestic debt 
markets were non-existent or small in most developing 
countries, but they have now expanded and are likely to 
continue growing strongly.
Domestic borrowing by governments, however, to 
expand public spending may crowd out domestic private 
sector borrowing needs. So non-governmental channels of 
international financing are needed as well. Mostly, this will 
come through the private sector looking abroad – banks 
borrow from their foreign counterparts, corporates access 
FDI, households receive remittances from abroad. In this 
way, even private-to-private external flows can indirectly 
contribute to domestic development financing for the 
public sector, by making it possible for the public sector to 
borrow from domestic sources without reducing growth.
We now turn to how to promote comprehensive 
financing strategies in the national, sectoral and global 
contexts.
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Summary:  
Costing and financing plans for the new Sustainable 
Development Goals need to be set firmly in a country 
context, so that key trade-offs – such as funding more 
infrastructure or social services at the margin or the 
interplay between foreign investments, taxes and public 
sector wages – can be fully explored. (The exception is 
goals and targets concerned with global public goods, like 
biodiversity loss.) We look at why global partnerships to 
mobilise resources have been relatively successful in the 
case of the first SDG cluster (basic needs), less intrinsically 
relevant for sustainable infrastructure investments, and 
problematic for global public goods. We look at specific 
policies to unlock access to private sector participation in 
five key sectors including, social services. We revisit the 
importance of reducing volatility, which remains high for 
grant-heavy aid as well as for FDI. And we introduce a 
Market Aid Index, to begin to track the intensity of donor 
engagement with the private sector.
Exploring trade-offs across goals and sources
One purpose of setting global development goals is to 
assess the adequacy of resources that can be mobilised 
for the task at hand and to advocate more funding if it 
is needed. A strategy for achieving each goal or target is 
credible only if it spells out what is needed in terms of 
financing, capacity-building, innovation, policy change, 
technology adoption and other means of implementation. 
During the course of implementing the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), global partnerships were 
developed to advocate for resources in health, food 
security, education, and maternal and child mortality. 
Considerable effort was devoted to costing the MDGs on 
a goal-by-goal basis and to putting in place new initiatives 
when it became apparent that targets were not being 
met because of lack of resources. This sector approach 
worked particularly well in raising funds for global health 
initiatives, although the impact on funding for other 
sectors, such as education and food security, was far lower.
There are, however, questions about whether such an 
approach is suitable for the more comprehensive and 
complex set of SDGs that are expected to be adopted. 
The United Nations (UN) Open Working Group builds 
on the tradition of MDG costing in proposing targets 
for financing under each goal (although without specific 
figures for the time being), while ICESDF reports on orders 
of magnitude of selected investment needs, taken from 
the literature. This shows that infrastructure, energy and 
climate change mitigation and adaptation are each likely 
to require orders of magnitude larger investments than the 
MDGs as we know them now. Nevertheless, the conclusion 
of ICESDF is that sufficient global savings exist, so the 
emphasis needs to be on shifting, even in a small way, the 
allocation of resources between purposes, and focusing on 
maximising flows from all sources to developing countries, 
rather than simply trying to maximise concessional flows. 
Given the global savings-investment context, we share 
this conclusion, and argue for additional financing to 
developing countries, preferably intermediated through 
official development agencies.
If larger flows of equity and debt could be mobilised 
for developing countries, it would permit them to expand 
investment in sustainable development, and to run modest 
current account deficits without unduly sacrificing current 
consumption. As a rough guide to orders of magnitude, 
a 3% of GDP average annual current account deficit for 
developing countries would require financing of about $1 
trillion in 2015-16, and would be sustainable in the sense 
of keeping long-term debt levels at less than 60% of GDP.2
What might country financing strategies look like and 
what kinds of trade-offs should they be considering?
National financing plans to integrate 
investment needs and financing sources
A country-level financing diagnostic approach may be 
useful, in addition to global sector approaches, as a way of 
understanding the spending and financing inputs to achieve 
the SDGs (Gable et al. 2014).One reason is that financing 
and investment programmes are highly context specific 
and depend crucially on the macroeconomic, policy and 
institutional environment in individual countries. With 
targets specified in terms of outcomes, the efficiency with 
which resources are used, the results orientation, is also a 
critical variable.
A national-level financing diagnostic permits 
governments to take into account a range of 
Section 2: Costing and  
resourcing the SDGs
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considerations, including within-country inequalities, 
vulnerabilities, linkages between targets, and 
macroeconomic management. It can also integrate the 
three types of development financing discussed above into 
a consistent package.
One tool for understanding where financing gaps might 
exist, and the space for incremental spending, is the World 
Bank’s Maquette for MDG Simulations (MAMS). MAMS 
brings to the fore issues of Dutch disease, absorptive 
capacity, and synergies between targets.3 It also breaks 
down gross national income (GNI) into its component 
parts of government, household and business income – an 
important distinction as each group contributes differently 
to spending for sustainable development: households 
along with government spend on meeting basic needs; 
governments on their own fund public goods; while 
governments and corporations finance investments in 
energy, connectivity and other economic activities to 
support national sustainable development.
Importantly, MAMS also provides a way of tracking 
deficits and debts over time to ensure that the financing 
plan is viable over time with properly sequenced and 
phased spending. Assessments of country creditworthiness 
and government indebtedness can also be carried out using 
the macroeconomic aggregate variables generated by the 
model.
Models permit more systematic identification of trade-
offs. In applying MAMS to various countries, key trade-
offs have been identified in the following areas: (1) the 
composition of public spending between growth-enhancing 
investments in infrastructure and basic service delivery, (2) 
the level of taxation (which alters how much governments 
and households spend on basic services, and also has 
indirect effects on profits and investments), (3) borrowing 
from commercial financial markets today while avoiding 
future creditworthiness problems, and (4) attracting 
FDI and private business growth while avoiding higher 
real wages in the public sector. MAMS underlines the 
importance of public spending effectiveness in determining 
optimum choices in the face of these trade-offs.
Because the targets in the SDGs are linked to each other 
and are quite comprehensive in scope, a comprehensive 
approach to spending and financing inputs is needed in 
addition to sector budget allocations. For example, recent 
research has suggested that sanitation is a critical factor in 
reducing malnutrition, so the goal for nutrition cannot be 
assessed just by looking at budget allocations for nutrition 
programmes.4 Similarly, girls’ education is one of the most 
important investments in reducing child mortality. The 
cost of achieving the desired outcome in any one area, 
then, depends on whether other targets are also being met. 
A national plan, derived from a model like MAMS, can 
take these synergies into account in developing budget 
allocations and spending targets for the government.
Why country context matters: examples of 
trade-offs across objectives, sources and time
One difficult issue in costing is assessing how needs and 
revenues change with general economic conditions. For 
example, the wage bill for nurses, teachers and other 
public sector employees is not usually directly linked to 
productivity in their own sector but to growth in tax 
revenues and conditions in the wider labour market. 
These depend on private sector activity. If massive FDI 
is attracted into a country it can lead to an appreciated 
exchange rate and hence higher public sector wages in 
dollar terms (and so a higher dollar cost of providing 
health and education services), but it can also lead to larger 
tax revenues and more income for households who in turn 
will spend more on health and education. The net impact 
of these forces is uncertain and will vary by country. 
But generally speaking, successful economic growth will 
raise the need for infrastructure investments and for 
spending on public services, unless it is accompanied by an 
improvement in the efficiency with which public funds are 
spent.
The composition of budget allocations also matters for 
growth and welfare. Carnahan and Evans (forthcoming) 
argue that in fragile states, emphasis should first be given 
to spending that promotes stability, including police, 
law and justice sector support as well as selected social 
spending, and jobs and livelihood programs. Productive 
investments in infrastructure to accelerate economic 
growth should only come later. In other situations, 
however, the sequencing could be reversed. An emphasis on 
productive investments can jump-start or sustain growth, 
which in turn can generate tax revenues for expanding 
social spending at a later date. These examples highlight 
the need to understand country context when determining 
spending priorities and sequencing, in order to arrive at a 
national financing plan.
MAMS can be used to frame priorities for a specific 
country. An example is given in Box 2.
No country exists in an international financial vacuum, 
of course, but what are the consistency problems that arise 
in tapping international sources, especially on market-
related terms?
Looking up from country level: the missing 
middle problem
National financing plans have to be made consistent with 
access to concessional foreign assistance and other sources 
of domestic and international capital. Most countries 
would prioritise access to grant-heavy aid over other 
forms of finance because such assistance has the fewest 
economic trade-offs (although there may be political 
economy considerations if aid comes with conditionality 
and cumbersome administrative procedures). But many 
countries would also benefit from greater access to official 
lending on harder terms.
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Box 2. MDG options in the country context – the case of Uganda 
The case of Uganda is an example of how MAMS can be used to frame priorities in the context of a specific 
country. A main finding of the case study is that public social service delivery was not the best policy instrument 
to accelerate achievement of MDGs for health and education in Uganda. Instead, household income growth was 
a more important driver of progress in these areas, as was public investment in physical infrastructure like rural 
roads, which in turn led to higher household incomes and more household spending on health and education 
(Matovu et al., 2011).
The Uganda example will not necessarily hold in other countries, as results depend on key parameters and 
initial conditions in the country. If a country is close to eradicating extreme poverty, it will have to traverse the 
‘last mile’ and target remote and excluded households. In the past, the unit costs of service delivery to hard-to-
reach communities could be significantly higher than average unit costs, but advances in technology, particularly 
digital identification cards, have sharply lowered the cost of government-to-people transactions. Publicly funded 
safety nets will be an important new tool in implementing the SDGs, and if these new technologies are available 
they could alter the results from MAMS.
Benefits can be further amplified if aid, and harder-
terms financing from multilateral and bilateral official 
agencies, can also be used to catalyse additional private 
capital. Given the history of debt crises in countries, and 
the substantial economic costs associated with them, it is 
important to be careful about the extent of indebtedness. 
However, these risks can also be overestimated. Current 
tools for assessing creditworthiness like the Debt 
Sustainability Framework of the World Bank and the IMF 
are backward-looking and based on historical conditions 
in global capital markets. They have not been updated to 
take into account the new low interest rate/high returns to 
infrastructure investment context for development. There 
is an ongoing effort to make this tool more flexible, but it 
remains limited in its ability to integrate the composition 
of public spending into a macroeconomic analysis. Instead, 
all public spending, recurrent and capital, is treated the 
same.
As a result of these and other restrictions, some of 
which are redundant, many LMICs are unable to access 
the non-concessional lending arms of IFIs to a sufficient 
degree, and are driven to private capital markets as a 
preferred alternative, despite the higher financial costs 
involved. Market-related official lending is not providing 
the bridge between aid and private capital markets that it 
once did. In 2013, only $11 billion in net disbursements 
from official lending on such terms was recorded. 
Guarantees cover only $5 billion per year on average.5 
Without much more financing from official institutions, it 
is unlikely that sufficient funds will be available to meet  
the SDGs (see further analysis and recommendations in 
Section 5).
Can supranational coalitions to raise money for 
thematic purposes, i.e. global partnerships, come to the 
rescue?
Global thematic partnerships,  
their strengths and weaknesses
Of the three categories of SDG needs described by ICESDF 
(as noted in Section 1), global sectoral (or thematic) 
partnerships and campaigns are best suited for the first 
type: mobilising resources for basic needs including food 
security, health, education, access to affordable energy and 
water and sanitation. Partnerships that bring together aid 
providers, partner countries and private philanthropies 
and foundations have shown how multi-stakeholder 
solutions can be devised. By focusing on outcomes, they 
have brought a results orientation to financing. They have 
provided a platform for communities of experts to analyse 
evidence, share knowledge and communicate with the rest 
of the world. Through global partnerships focused on basic 
needs, it seems possible to motivate individuals, businesses 
and governments by showing them that their contributions 
and efforts are making a tangible difference to the lives of 
the poorest.
Although these sector partnerships have tried to include 
private business (for example, the private sector window 
in the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program), 
the results to date have been limited, outside of health. 
Nevertheless, a growing number of corporations have 
started sustainability reporting as part of their standard 
management toolkit and have found ways of aligning their 
core interests in long-term profit maximisation with a 
sustainable development approach.
Global partnerships for national sustainable 
development investments (such as renewable energy) have 
not been widely used. Many of the investments are large, 
and financing is raised on a case-by-case basis as in mega-
infrastructure deals. There is a desire in some advanced 
countries to treat emerging economies in a differential 
fashion if they are viewed as significant economic 
competitors (see Section 5), so a global approach is not 
always preferred.
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Global partnerships could in theory also serve to rally 
support for global public goods that are currently heavily 
underfunded, but in practice they have not worked well. 
The UN’s peacekeeping operations face severe budget 
shortfalls. Biodiversity funding has never received the 
attention it merits, despite its inclusion in the MDGs. And 
although the climate change mitigation challenge has been 
approached with a promise of truly ‘additional’ financing 
and with the creation of the Green Climate Fund, the Fund 
has only just begun to receive major pledges of assistance 
($2.3 billion as of 30 September 2014). The most recent 
example, tackling the Ebola challenge, shows just how 
hard it is to fund preventative investments that characterise 
many public goods, like health system strengthening, rather 
than treating crises ex post.
It must be noted that, historically, funding for public 
goods has been difficult to mobilise. This is true at the 
national level, where most countries still have inadequate 
protections to ensure clean air and water, for example, 
and it is doubly true at the global level. There are no 
instruments for a common global tax, which would be 
the preferred economic way of financing global public 
goods from a purely technical perspective, so voluntary 
contributions are solicited from individual countries. 
But getting agreement on adequate funding levels is 
hard. Countries try to shift the burden onto others (the 
‘free-rider problem’); the UN has adopted language called 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ to indicate an 
understanding that burden-sharing will differ depending 
on the issue and on country circumstances and context, but 
there are no global rules or standards for financing public 
goods like peacekeeping, climate change or biodiversity. As 
a result, these critical areas of sustainable development are 
still massively underfunded across the globe.
Thus, global partnerships are most likely to be useful 
for the category of basic needs financing where the link 
between resources and results is more visible. For national 
sustainable development investments, country-level or 
project-level partnerships to unblock policy constraints and 
share risks are likely to be more efficient. For global public 
goods suffering from the free-rider problem, incentives 
other than coercive treaties or taxes may be needed. For 
example, awareness campaigns to educate people about 
the need for change can prompt collective action even 
without financial incentives. An example is climate change: 
the movement is reaching a critical tipping point, with 
masses now prepared to contribute because it is the ‘right’ 
thing to do, as well as the ‘smart’ and ‘necessary’ thing 
to do. Global solidarity of this type can potentially offset 
the free-rider problems that presently exist (Jameson and 
Miyoshi, 1998).
If the private sector is relatively less easily reached by 
global partnerships, except in a few specific cases, how 
then is its potential to be best tapped? And where is it most 
likely to be effective and under what conditions?
Policies for unlocking private financing for 
sustainable development
The Monterrey conference of March 2002 presented 
a major breakthrough in terms of expanding ODA to 
provide the resources necessary for achieving the MDGs 
– in exchange for which, developing counties would give 
priority attention to the specific targets agreed in the 
MDGs. At the next financing for development conference, 
scheduled for July 2015 in Ethiopia, the bargaining will 
be more subtle. There are only around 30 LICs that can 
expect to continue to receive ODA for the entire 2015-
2030 period, while there are about 30 major assistance 
providers, including emerging powers, plus 130 countries 
that are not really in either category – though more and 
more of them are becoming simultaneously ‘receivers’ 
and ‘transmitters’ of development cooperation (ideas, 
know-how and trade links as much as finance) from each 
other. Engaging these 130 countries which are primarily 
interested in national sustainable development investments, 
and improving their access to finance is one principal 
challenge for the conference. Avoiding a divisive zero-sum 
discussion of where to draw aid, or international public 
finance, allocation boundaries is another.
This suggests that the discussion on financing for 
development must shift in large part from a quantitative 
‘needs’ assessment to a qualitative ‘policy’ discussion. It 
will not be possible to pledge, for example, that private 
resources will flow to developing countries, but it will be 
possible to undertake a series of policy commitments – 
including global systemic changes like collaboration to 
stem illicit financial flows – that should help to unlock 
more long-term capital for sustainable development.
In order to do this successfully, policy issues must be 
disaggregated sufficiently in terms of their impact on goals 
and targets so that the link between outcomes, policy 
change, and the provision of additional financing by 
these independent actors is made clear. Generally benign 
policy prescriptions, like ‘improve domestic financial 
markets and open capital markets’, can help create the 
right environment for private capital flows, but there are 
different issues in each sector that warrant more specific 
attention.
Table 2 below shows five areas where there are policy 
and institutional blockages to the flow of long-term private 
capital into five core sustainable development sectors: (1) 
infrastructure and decarbonisation of the economy, (2) 
agriculture and food security, (3) extractive industries, (4) 
social impact sectors, and (5) services, especially  
finance (Kharas and McArthur, 2014). In many 
conventional descriptions to date, item (4) is scarcely 
alluded to, but private provision of health and education 
services, solar lighting and energy-efficient cook stoves and 
other social investments has soared. Social impact investing 
could be a $500 billion asset class by 2020 (Freireich and 
Fulton, 2009).
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We discuss each sector in turn below Table 2, which 
summarises the issue. This is not to minimise the 
importance of general improvements in standards, rules 
and global partnerships, but to recognise that additionally 
there are important sectors that require specific treatment 
if significant change is to occur.
There is considerable private sector interest in financing 
infrastructure, but the private sector currently provides 
only one-third of all infrastructure finance and is unlikely 
to move beyond 40%-45% (Bhattacharya, 2012). The 
task force report of the Australian B20 (a business group 
set up to advise the G20 leaders’ summit) identifies 
inadequate project selection and prioritisation (project 
pipeline), weak project execution capabilities, unstable 
investment and regulatory environments, and opaqueness 
and corruption as key barriers (B20, 2014). They call for 
the establishment of a global infrastructure hub (launched 
in Sydney by the G20 in November), procurement reforms 
and harmonisation, international accounting changes 
to reduce the bias against long-term infrastructure 
investments, and improved credit enhancement and 
co-investment mechanisms that reduce risks in the early 
stages of the project. This mix of policy, institutional and 
financial instrument obstacles suggests roles for aid, for 
capacity-building in the public sector, and for risk-bearing 
instruments among other official finance (OF).
Agriculture investments are heavily driven by the 
private sector and there is renewed interest in the 
integration of smallholder farmers into global value chains 
managed by large multinational companies. The New 
Vision for Agriculture platform of the World Economic 
Forum has developed a transformation framework that 
calls for strategies and priorities to identify effective 
directions, and delivery at scale of hard and soft 
infrastructure investments, with associated financing 
and risk management solutions. These principles are 
being operationalised through national and regional 
partnerships. Within these, there is a significant role for 
aid in organising farmers to reduce the transaction costs 
of linking them into value chains (including of large 
commercial agriculture), undertaking the public good of 
training, investing in physical infrastructure like rural 
roads to improve connectivity, undertaking research and 
diffusing knowledge, and improving the strategic planning 
and executing capabilities of national ministries.
Extractive industry businesses are among the largest 
providers of FDI in LICs. To avoid the ‘resource curse’, 
projects in extractive sectors should be accompanied by 
associated programmes for local livelihood development, 
extensive consultations of affected groups, and public 
expenditure management strengthening. Infrastructure 
to help offset Dutch disease problems may also be 
important. Aid and public development finance agencies 
Table 2. Gaps and priorities for enhanced private investment
Investment category Common missing pieces Institutional implications  
for global actors
Regulatory, procedural, or policy Public investment or fiscal support
Infrastructure	and	
decarbonisation
Project	preparation;	regulatory	agency	
strengthening;	domestic	financial	
intermediaries;	long-term	political	risk	
insurance
Commitments	to	carbon	pricing;	more	
willingness	to	use	guarantees	and	
first-loss	instruments;	public	finance	for	
enhanced	credit	mechanisms
Larger	multilateral	mechanisms	
that	support	project	preparation	and	
provide	public	non-concessional	loans;	
adequately	funded	climate	funds	to	
subsidise	clean	energy;	harmonised	
procedures	among	development	finance	
institutions
Agriculture Comprehensive	national	agricultural	
plans;	subsidy	and	procurement	price	
reform;	land	and	water	regulations;	
organisation	of	farmer	associations	to	
more	easily	link	into	global	value	chains
Investment	in	roads,	ports	and	storage;	
credit	systems;	climate	and	crop	
insurance	systems
Agricultural	research	in	developing	
countries;	large-scale	support	for	
agricultural	credit;	country-level	public-
private	partnerships;	national	agricultural	
transformation	agencies
Extractive	industries Community	consent;
transparency	requirements	for	
exploration	and	negotiation
Sustainability	of	local	social	service	
provision;	local	development	benefits
Establishment	of	national	sovereign	
wealth	funds	and/or	prudent	budget	
policies	for	managing	natural	resources	
wealth
Social	impact	sectors Permit	for-profit	social	enterprises;	
standardised	social	and	environmental	
results	monitoring
Early	stage	capital;	social	impact	bonds	
where	appropriate
International	mechanisms/portals	to	
scale	up	social	enterprises;	consistent	
standards	to	judge	impact
Services	(e.g.	finance,	retail,	
information	technology)
Macro-prudential	regulations;	financial	
market	development;	transparency	of	
subsidiary	investments
National	development	banks;	equity	
provision	for	small	and	medium	
enterprises
Stronger	regional	credit	rating	systems
Source: Kharas, H. and McArthur, J. (2014).
22 Financing the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals
can contribute. In addition, international and domestic 
regulatory bodies can promote standards with greater 
transparency and reporting by firms with country-level 
detail, as for example by implementing agreements such as 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.
Social impact investments are the placement of capital 
with the ‘intention to generate a measurable, beneficial 
social and environmental impact alongside a financial 
return. Impact investments can be made in both emerging 
and developed markets, and target a range of returns from 
below-market to above-market rates, depending upon 
the circumstances’ (Impact Investing, 2014). Those social 
impact investments that earn commercial rates of return 
can be scaled quickly when a successful business model 
is found. Impact investments can cover several social 
sectors, including health, schools (even primary schools for 
low-income communities), water supply, sanitation and 
other services. Usually, they are best suited to sectors where 
operating costs are low and can be managed within an 
affordable price point but where upfront investment costs 
(both physical and organisational) are high and cannot 
be recouped with the slim operating margins that are 
available (Kubzansky, 2013).
If grant funds were available to internalise the many 
social and environmental externalities generated by social 
impact investments, or to provide catalytic early stage 
capital, the scope for more rapid diffusion is enormous. 
Some studies suggest that investment opportunities in this 
market segment could be between $400 billion and $1 
trillion in the next decade (O’Donohoeet al., 2010). Private 
philanthropic funds, which are more nimble than most 
aid, might be best suited to pursue these opportunities. But 
regulatory changes can also help. The G8 countries have 
each prepared a report on what can be done in their own 
countries. In the United States, the report concludes, ‘Policy 
matters greatly. Government acts as regulator and standard 
setter, but also as a co-investor, risk mitigator, major buyer 
of goods and services, and sometimes as a market maker’ 
(NAB, 2014). The report concludes that the industry is at 
an inflection point of growth. However, any public funding 
that is used should demonstrate that the catalytic impact 
of public funding of these types of projects is indeed 
creating sustainable development in a more cost-effective 
way than direct financing through aid. A new $200 million 
Global Innovation Fund has been launched by United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
the Department for International Development (DFID), 
Sweden, Australia and the Omidyar Network to build these 
markets. The Fund will promote pilots and help successful 
ventures to scale up.
The domestic financial sector remains the most 
important channel through which private funding flows 
into developing countries. Strengthening regulations, 
enhancing equity and risk-bearing instruments, and 
developing intermediaries with a focus on development 
activities can help ensure that long-term funds are made 
available for sustainable development. Development 
finance institutions are well placed to help strengthen 
domestic financial intermediaries and the supporting 
regulatory environment.
The areas noted above cover many, but not all, sectors. 
Public goods – like police and justice sectors, but also 
including national statistical gathering, research and 
planning and execution capabilities – must be financed 
from government revenues or aid, even when delivery can 
be (partly) contracted to other actors. The extent of these 
‘collective’ consumption expenditures by governments 
varies widely. They average $550 (2011 PPP)/person/year 
in Africa and Asia, but are double that in Latin America, 
and average $5,000/person/year in the United States 
(World Bank, 2014a).
In addition, the government should provide a range 
of basic services, sometimes in kind, but increasingly in 
cash. Safety nets for poor households, to provide food and 
other basic necessities to those affected by disasters, are 
becoming monetised as a way of improving efficiency.
The foregoing tends to assume that public and private 
flows for development are predictable and sustainable, 
broadly to the same extent in the same contexts. But that is 
not yet true, as we see now.
Volatility and complementarity  
of private and public sources
One key feature of sustainable development financing is 
that the money destined for it should be long-term and 
sustainable itself, at least at the country level and typically 
also at the sectoral level. This is often not the case. Aid 
received by countries can be highly volatile – naturally so 
in the case of humanitarian aid, but unnecessarily so in 
the case of development aid. ODA is more volatile than 
tax revenues in all country groups, for example (Table 
3). The high degree of volatility gets reflected in projects 
that never expand to scale, and in an unwillingness of 
finance ministries to commit to expenditures before aid 
commitments are booked, and in shifting donor priorities 
and fads. Volatility of aid has been a particular issue in 
post-conflict countries where domestic institutions are 
weak and political upheavals are common, but where it 
is even more important to take a long-term perspective 
on development programmes (Fengler and Kharas, 2010). 
On average, volatility in aid has reduced its benefits to 
recipients by around 20% (Kharas, 2008).
Private finance is also volatile, especially in LICs, 
where both FDI and remittances display substantial ups 
and downs. Capital flow volatility has been linked to a 
significant dampening in economic growth (World Bank, 
2002). It tends to be procyclical.
A focus on volatility in different contexts highlights 
that capital is not homogeneous but has to be considered 
in terms of its availability, push-and-pull factors in each 
sector, and interlinkages with other flows and with 
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Table 3. Capital flow volatility by source and country group (1995-2011)6
Country Group ODA Tax revenues Domestic credit Remittances FDI
Low-Middle Income 0.24 0.04 0.17 0.21 0.46
Upper-Middle income 0.37 0.15 0.18 0.26 0.15
Low Income 0.17 0.07 0.21 0.40 0.43
Least Developed Country 0.16 0.22 0.24 0.16 0.29
Fragile states 0.27 0.14 0.24 0.44 0.47
Source: Data collected for European Report on Development 2014. Bold highlights substantial volatility (coefficient of variation above 0.2)
Note: Using coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by mean).
different policy and institutional environments. It’s also 
a reminder that policies matter in determining both the 
quantity and the quality of capital flows and their ultimate 
effectiveness in supporting sustainable development.
With this in mind, a menu of options for improving 
global financing frameworks for sustainable development 
can be considered. These options should, ideally, build on 
work that is already under way, accelerating the processes 
to arrive at consensus and broadening the partnership of 
those prepared to act now. This will enable the Financing 
for Development conference in Addis Ababa to focus on 
concrete outcomes. In addition, space must be left for new 
ideas and initiatives as markets are changing rapidly in 
many areas. The Addis event cannot be the last word on 
development finance for the SDGs. We offer some specific 
additional suggestions in Section 5.
We end this section with a small demonstration of how 
hard it is to pin down the private-public development 
finance interface and, by the same token, what could be 
achieved if we had better metrics and more transparency in 
this area
Towards a Market Aid Index: a first cut
When considering the interface between public and 
private finance, at any level, it soon becomes apparent that 
there are no widely agreed concepts and metrics that can 
benchmark the intent and/or effect of such combinations.
The bigger underlying problem is that there are no 
common standards to help judge whether or not a private 
investment has been triggered by some specific public 
support. Part of this in turn relates to rarely having a 
counterfactual by which to gauge the catalytic impact 
of the public support given, compared to a purely 
private alternative. Public agencies are also failing to 
account consistently for their inputs, i.e. which pieces 
of the international public finance pie are particularly 
associated with private finance and which are not. There 
are no common definitions, for example, on leverage; and 
reporting is weak and inconsistent, notably on guarantees 
(see Section 6 for specific suggestions).
We thought it useful to test drive a crude ‘Market 
Aid Index’ that attempts to compare the extent to which 
donors deliberately associate their activities with private 
finance or market-oriented projects and programmes. As 
far as we know, this is the first time it has been attempted. 
We started with Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
bilateral donors only.
The methodology is sketched out below and expanded 
in Annex 2. We had intended to use a third element in this 
index, counting guarantees as well, but too few donors 
responded to the relevant DAC survey (and with very high 
variance) for this sample to be reliable. We think further 
work on these definitions could be extremely helpful, for 
both private and public finance actors. We also did not, 
for now, extend the analysis to the multilateral banks, or 
the imputed share of their activities to be credited to their 
shareholders, but this could be done.
Our Market Aid Index is based on analysis for a 
range of DAC countries of (1) the share of their ODA 
(not adjusted for the share of grants and loans within 
it) focused on private sector development and catalytic 
financing (see Annex 2 for details) and (2) the OOF share 
of their total official flows – ODA plus other official 
flows.7 For each of these categories, countries are given a 
normalised score 0 (for the lowest share in each category) 
1 (for the highest share in each category), and the index 
combines their scores for both of these categories. The 
maximum possible score is therefore 2.
We stress that there is no normative significance – no 
implied merit rating – attached to achieving a higher or 
lower score in this index. It is just an attempt to quantify 
what share of the donor’s activities is plausibly associated 
with private finance for development. Ideally, this input 
perspective should be combined with impact measures, 
which as mentioned are particularly hard to come by in 
this area.
The countries with the highest overall score by some 
margin for this index are Republic of South Korea (1.67) 
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and Japan (1.53), with Japan having the highest share of 
ODA focused on private sector development and catalytic 
financing and South Korea the highest share of total 
official flows provided through OOFs. Other high-scoring 
countries overall are Canada (1 – largely based on its 
OOF score of 0.68) and Germany (0.97 – largely based 
on its ODA score of 0.82). Those also scoring highly 
on their ODA levels include Spain (0.58), New Zealand 
(0.50), Belgium (0.49), Finland (0.41), France (0.35) and 
the UK (0.35). Those also scoring highly on their OOF 
levels include Finland (0.35) and Austria (0.31). (Note that 
the UK, unlike others listed, does not operate a bilateral 
development bank as such.) A number of countries, finally, 
scored below 0.3 on both categories of the index, including 
Greece (the lowest scorer overall and on private sector 
shares, with no OOF reported), Portugal, Luxembourg, 
Australia, Sweden, Ireland, Switzerland, Italy and the USA.
A very preliminary interpretation of this scoring is 
simply that donors vary considerably in the range and 
intensity of instruments they deploy to draw on or connect 
with private market finance, and in the case of OOF versus 
ODA loans, in the terms they offer. This variation matters, 
especially in a favourable capital markets context. The 
bigger challenge remains not just in determining the size of 
public financial inputs aimed at catalysing private sector-
led development, but also in establishing their impact.
We now turn to how different types of countries 
are affected by different flows of finance, and what 
implications this has for public policy.
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Figure 2. Market Aid Index
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Summary: 
We look at how a country’s mix of development finance 
changes as it grows. Static per capita income thresholds 
are increasingly unreliable guides to allocation, and 
categories based on them exhibit wider variations in key 
poverty-related attributes than do other internationally 
recognised categories, such as LDC. Considering financing 
patterns for each country as its income rises, a ‘missing 
middle’ emerges. Total public finance falls continuously 
as a share of national income, right up until the high-
income threshold, as aid falls faster than tax revenues rise. 
Private external sources not only do not correct for this, 
they actually accentuate the proportional fall in foreign 
resources, especially as the share of remittances peaks at 
around the LMIC threshold. Alternative groupings would 
therefore also need to take into account factors like fiscal 
capacity, as well as creditworthiness and vulnerability. 
Many LMICs, as well as most LICs, would need to levy 
prohibitively high marginal tax rates to close their poverty 
gaps unaided.
The problem with income-based 
classifications
Since 2000, 30 ‘low-income’ countries have become 
‘middle-income’ (see Figure 3)8, surpassing the middle 
income GNI per capita threshold of $1,045 in 2013. 
Notice that this only corresponds to less than $3 per day, 
on average, and of course many millions are below that 
average. There are now only 339 LICs left in the world, 
compared with 63 in 2000.
Section 3: Development finance and 
country classifications
Figure 3. Country classification by income level
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There are two main problems with income-based 
classifications.10 The first one is analytical. The middle-
income country (MIC) group is already very heterogeneous 
in terms of major poverty, human development and 
other attributes. It encompasses such diverse countries 
as Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) members Mexico and Turkey, at 
the top end of the spectrum, and Madagascar, Zambia and 
Nigeria at the bottom end, with among the highest shares 
of population in the world living below $1.25 day  
in 2010.11 The LIC group is also diverse, with some 
countries in conflict, others small islands, and still others 
struggling to cope with poor governance. Some are 
landlocked with little prospects for trade, while others have 
dynamic neighbourhoods. Many countries, both LICs and 
MICs, have poor data, resulting in large sudden changes 
in income per capita simply due to the serendipitous result 
of rebasing of GDP statistics,12 as occurred recently in the 
cases of Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria.
The second problem with country classifications 
is operational. Being an LIC is the main criterion for 
eligibility for grants and concessional loans under the 
(so-called) soft-loan window of the World Bank Group, 
the International Development Association (IDA),13 and 
this status also informs the allocation policies of many 
other agencies. Countries that graduated from IDA to 
less concessional World Bank terms (IBRD) hitherto did 
so relatively abruptly, and this move typically triggered a 
deeper overall reduction in the volume of external finance. 
But it usually takes much longer for such graduates to 
achieve substantial and reliable financial market access, 
or to develop their own domestic tax base. Meanwhile, 
these less concessional public windows may not meet 
the graduate’s needs in either volume and/or other terms 
(Section 5).
Next, we look more closely at the typical ‘missing 
middle’ funding problem.
The missing middle: international flows fall 
faster than tax revenues rise
Clustering around arbitrary income thresholds may have 
very little bearing on the different access to and capacity to 
mobilise resources of each country, which are continuous 
rather than discrete (Kenny, 2011) along the income per 
capita spectrum. There is no statistically significant pattern 
distinguishing LICs from LMICs for tax revenues and FDI 
inflows. There is only one flow where LICs do strongly 
differ from the other two income categories and it is ODA, 
where LICs are the largest recipients of ODA as a share of 
GDP.
A different picture emerges if we track and smooth 
shifts in resources for a wide range of developing countries 
in 2011 and 2012 as their per capita income rises. (The 
methodology for this analysis is explained in Annex 1.) 
External public finance, both concessional and market-
related, declines steadily and then more steeply as a share 
of GDP as country income progresses from a very low 
base (yellow in Figure 4 below). As we see in Figure 5 and 
Section 5, OOF –  especially the market-related lending of 
MDBs – plays a negligible corrective role, for supply-side 
reasons. This decline continues until upper-income levels 
are reached. Meanwhile, domestic tax revenues do rise 
with income per capita, but only when countries are well 
into the middle-income range (red line in Figure 4), and 
this rise levels out as international public finance continues 
its fall.
The net result (purple, Figure 4) is that total public 
finance available falls, in proportion to national income, 
over a critical stage in country income growth. The 
fall in the share of ODA and harder-terms loans is not 
compensated by rising tax revenues for countries whose 
per capita income is between $1,850 and $13,000, i.e. until 
high-income status.14 Total public resources at best stabilise 
at the upper bound of LMIC before continuing to erode.
This declining international public support as country 
incomes and general government revenues grow (a ‘missing 
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middle’) is, if anything, aggravated by a simultaneous  
retreat in private external finance (Figure 4). FDI, which 
is already proportionately important at quite low-income 
stages (Section 2), and remittances, which peak at around 
the lower MIC threshold, fail to compensate for the decline 
in international public resources. This necessarily leaves 
domestic private finance to pick up the slack as income 
rises – not a problem in itself but full of policy implications 
for the SDGs.
The first and obvious policy conclusion this takes us 
toward is to try to rectify the fall in international public 
finance by better differentiation of concessional assistance 
in favour of less creditworthy countries (see also section 1), 
as well as encouraging both more market-related funding 
overall and a smoother official process (section 2 above 
and 5 and 6 below) for “graduating” LICs.
A second line of enquiry relates to finding alternative 
country allocation criteria that take account of the slower 
build-up of domestic fiscal revenues across this transition. 
We first look at fragility, in addition to creditworthiness, as 
a possible but problematic benchmark.
Moving beyond classification based on income 
levels: fragility and domestic tax capacity
With as many as 130 developing countries that are 
likely neither to remain long-term aid recipients nor to 
become advanced donor countries (Section 2), some 
alternative clustering of needs and capacities along 
common features would still be helpful to inform policy 
decisions on allocating limited resources across countries. 
We discussed grouping countries by creditworthiness in 
Section 1. Are there other useful ways of representing 
logical groupings relevant to needs and availability of 
resources that are both analytically sound and politically 
feasible? We look mainly here at (1) fragility, including as 
proxied by UN-recognised categories like LDCs and SIDS, 
and (2) domestic tax capacity, in relation to resources 
needed to close the country’s poverty gap.
Fragility
With the future locus of global poverty projected to be 
in fragile states (Kharas and Rogerson, 2012), one could 
consider distinguishing countries based on whether they 
are classified as fragile or not, but fragility is not a more 
consistent indicator, analytically, than income level and 
there is a lack of consensus over its definition. For example, 
the World Bank and the OECD classify different countries 
as ‘fragile’. In both definitions, fragile countries15 have on 
average much lower tax ratios16 and significantly higher aid 
ratios17 than non-fragile countries. But there are countries 
classified as fragile that can mobilise more domestic 
resources than non-fragile countries (such as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and resource-rich countries like Liberia). 
Some fragile countries have had conflicts, others not. 
Fragile countries include aid darlings, such as Afghanistan 
and Malawi, but also aid orphans, such as Chad and Sierra 
Leone (Ericsson and Steensen, 2014), and countries with 
relatively low aid/GDP ratios, such as Sudan, Yemen, Iraq 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the last two of which are also 
MICs.
Looking at the other accepted ways of clustering 
developing countries – World Bank operational thresholds 
(IDA, Blend and IBRD); LDC; SIDS; landlocked developing 
countries (LLDC); categories of the Human Development 
Index (HDI), low, medium and high development – they all 
appear more homogenous than the income classification 
(pale green bars for LICs, LMICs and UMICs) (Figure 6)18 
when looked at from the perspective of ODA ratios.
Why so? Some of these classifications build in a gradual 
process for graduation (LDC graduation requires at least 
three more years after at least two of the three criteria are 
met, for example), while others are invariant because they 
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are tied to the country’s geography (SIDSs and LLDCs), 
and yet other measures are broader-based, going beyond 
income (LDC classifi cation also takes into economic 
vulnerability, measured by exposure to shocks and shifts 
in exports and to natural disasters; HDI factors in life 
expectancy; mean and expected years of schooling, etc.).
Fiscal capacity
One of the objectives of development assistance is to 
allocate resources to those countries that do not have 
suffi cient capacity to mobilise their own resources for 
poverty reduction. A good way to measure that capacity 
is to compare the poverty gap – the total level of public 
transfers potentially needed to pull all those below the 
$1.25 a day (PPP) poverty line up to it – with tax revenues. 
This comparison can be expressed as the additional tax 
share of GDP needed to end poverty, or as the marginal 
tax rate on taxpayers considered non-poor (by US 
purchasing-power standards) needed to generate that extra 
tax (Ravallion, 2009). A marginal rate of 100% means 
this policy option is unaffordable with the current income 
distribution – as the entire income of the ‘rich’ would have 
to be taxed away to lift all the poor out of poverty. The 
more the country’s income is concentrated at the top end, 
however, the lower the marginal rate needed will be, for a 
given poverty gap.
Considering a country’s ability to redistribute its 
resources to its poor people, the LIC and LMIC categories 
become even less useful. Figure 7 depicts marginal tax 
rates along the income per capita spectrum(based on the 
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Figure 8. Marginal tax rate by income group
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Development Indicators Poverty data released by World Bank in October 2014. 
Data reported in Annex 3. The whiskers-box plot describes the distribution 
in each income group. The median of the distribution corresponds to the red 
bar with the upper edge indicating the 75th percentile and the lower edge the 
25th percentile. Dots refer to outliers. Based on income classification in 2012.
methodology set in Ravallion, 2009, but with poverty 
figures updated by the World Bank as of October 2014, 
see Annex 3.19 It is no surprise that the richer the country, 
the lower the marginal tax ratio. There are several LMICs, 
however, such as Cameroon, Ghana, India, Lesotho, 
Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Swaziland and Zambia, that 
would require a 100% marginal tax rate on ‘rich’ taxpayer 
income to lift all citizens out of poverty (see top left of 
Figure 7).
Another way of looking at this variation is by 
comparing the marginal tax rate figures across income 
cluster. Figure 8 illustrates how dispersed marginal tax 
rates are – from zero up to 100% – in the case of countries 
classified as LMICs.
As Figure 7 and 8 show, if one accepts the idea that 
the marginal tax rate required to end poverty is a useful 
indicator of the gap between the extent of poverty and a 
country’s ability to reduce poverty unaided, and if ODA 
should be primarily oriented to ending poverty, then 
it makes little sense for ODA to be allocated primarily 
according to recipient country per capita income levels.
Conclusion
With diverging performance among countries on poverty 
reduction and resource mobilisation, income classifications 
are becoming less and less relevant; LIC, LMIC (especially) 
and MIC groups are quite heterogeneous. Other recognised 
classifications – such as LDC and SIDS – are better options 
for analytical purposes, including by capturing fragility 
attributes indirectly; both have relatively low variation in 
countries’ performance on taxes and on ODA receipts. Two 
other criteria have to be factored into the classification of 
countries for development finance purposes: first, a proxy 
for financial market access and creditworthiness (discussed 
in Section 1), and second, a country’s fiscal capacity to fill 
its poverty gap, as discussed in this section – which further 
argues for differentiation between LMICs.
These conclusions, however, relate primarily to the first 
two goal clusters in the ICESDF set (Figure 1), namely 
infrastructure and basic needs.
 But what of the global public goods cluster and, in 
particular, climate change, which by definition invokes 
effects and priorities beyond the single-country context? 
Surely this requires a complete overhaul of the single-
country development paradigm and how development 
programmes are designed and implemented today? We turn 
to this now.
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Summary:
We revisit the debate on trade-offs between ‘green’ growth 
paths and faster poverty reduction. Overall, the argument 
that poverty elimination needs to be slowed in the pursuit of 
global climate change mitigation does not hold. However, for 
a range of very poor countries with limited capital market 
access, self-interest may not align well with green growth. 
This need not be of international concern, as the aggregate 
share of the global carbon footprint of these countries will 
remain insignificant for many years. The geography of 
climate mitigation finance is however very different from 
that of development, and inherently skewed towards carbon-
intensive emerging economies that enjoy ready access to 
global capital markets. The finite grant element available from 
concessional aid (until the latter is massively boosted by new 
resources tapped at the global level) will therefore have to be 
rationed in favour of adaptation (with a preference for LDCs) 
and in favour of less creditworthy countries for mitigation.
A trade-off between growth and climate change 
mitigation and resilience?
The current proposal of the UN Open Working Group on 
SDGs has separate and parallel goals for poverty reduction 
(end poverty everywhere or the ‘getting to zero’ agenda), 
sustainable development (promote sustainable infrastructure 
and industrialisation and foster innovation and promote 
sustainable consumption and production patterns, among 
other goals), and climate change (take urgent action to 
combat climate change and its impacts). At the same time, 
debates continue on a binding international climate action 
agreement to be reached at the 21st Conference of the Parties 
on Climate Change in Paris in December 201520 and on what 
comes next after the MDGs are running on parallel tracks.
There is a long-standing dilemma between reducing 
poverty and fighting climate change (and entering into a 
sustainable development path – Stern Commission and 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), 2007) or, put another way, a 
problem of ensuring that countries grow fast enough to 
eliminate poverty in a generation yet simultaneously emit less 
or keep emissions low (Mitchell and Maxwell, 2010).
While, historically, economic growth was key for 
countries to reduce poverty at scale (with China being a 
notable example) and increase resilience/climate change 
adaptive capacity (as reviewed in Dercon, 2014a; Dell et 
al., 2008, 2009, Raddatz, 2009; Noy, 2009), growth based 
on fossil fuels has been damaging for the environment 
and for individuals’ health (see Dercon, 2014b), as it is 
usually accompanied by increasing emissions and other 
environmental stresses (e.g. UNEP, 2007, as reviewed in 
Swart, 2008).
A structural shift from ‘brown’ to ‘green’ growth will not 
be cost free, because of the investment necessary to convert 
production process and technologies into low carbon and 
climate resilient capital stocks. The removal of fossil fuel 
subsidies would be beneficial for the poor only if the resulting 
savings in public finance were to be effectively recycled into 
other poverty reduction programs (see Dercon, 2014). Dercon 
(2014b) also draws attention to the acute problem facing 
some 50 countries who will be unable to fund their own 
fight against poverty (using a tax base with realistic marginal 
rates, see Section 3) without at least 15 years of rapid growth, 
implying a concomitant rise in emission intensity from a very 
low base. Yet even after 2030, these countries’ contribution 
to the global carbon footprint remains minuscule (2%-3%), 
which argues for differential treatment, with safeguards 
against ‘locking in’ high-carbon growth paths for the longer 
term. Dercon’s larger point is that green growth should 
be accompanied by sensible poverty reduction policies 
(facilitated by savings from cutting fossil fuel subsidies, for 
example), not that green growth should be avoided altogether.
There is a growing body of evidence that poverty reduction 
through economic growth and sustainable, climate resilient 
development are feasible concurrent policy objectives. The 
recently released report by the Global Commission on the 
Economy and Climate (Calderón et al., 2014) argues this to 
be the case when policy is examined in a dynamic context of 
change, and when existing economic inefficiencies and the 
multiple benefits of action and costs of inaction are taken 
into account. First, tackling climate change risk is seen as the 
only way to have strong and sustained long-term economic 
growth with a pivotal role played by innovative climate 
resilient production processes. Second, the costs of delaying 
action are estimated to be higher than the costs of acting now. 
Third, reducing the use of fossil fuel brings health benefits, 
and recycling revenues from carbon pricing increases fiscal 
efficiency, and both of these can offset economic costs of 
climate action (the latter estimated to be around 1.7% of 
baseline global GDP in 2030). Fourth, a ‘brown economy’ 
also comes with short-term direct costs: governments in 
both developed and developing countries directly subsidise 
production and consumption of fossil fuels by $600 billion 
(see also Nakhooda, 2014; Whitley, 2013), which corresponds 
to 0.8% of global GDP, and indirectly provides another 
$1,300 billion in subsidies (IMF, 2013, $1.9 trillion in energy 
subsidies).21
Section 4: Climate change and 
development finance: strange bedfellows?
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In sum, there is ample reason to believe that climate resilient 
growth and rapid poverty reduction can – indeed must – go 
hand in hand, as a general proposition. However, when a 
subset of low-income, non-creditworthy countries consider 
their growth strategies, they may have to use higher discount 
rates than apply globally, leading to different investment 
choices appropriate for their specific context. This, however, 
should have a negligible impact on the global carbon 
footprint.
So, is there any other inherent tension between climate 
change finance and concessional development assistance? 
Well, yes, because their allocation principles are profoundly 
different and cannot easily be accommodated within a 
single set of rules.
Climate change and development  
finance: two silos?
What are the estimated costs of cutting greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions and improving resilience to the effects of 
climate change? Mitigation of GHG emissions in developing 
countries could, by 2030, cost between $140 billion (World 
Bank WDR, 2010) and $563 billion (McKinsey & Co., 
2009) each year in upfront investments.22 For investment 
in climate change resilience (adaptation), costs are expected 
to rise to a yearly average of $70 billion to $100 billion, 
at 2005 prices, between 2010 and 2050 (see World Bank, 
2010a; also Baudienville, 2010. Delete ‘and Climate Funds 
Update). These latter figures amount to about ‘only’ 0.2% of 
the projected GDP of all developing countries in the current 
decade (World Bank, 2010b). While these cost projections are 
approximate, their upper range goes well beyond the levels of 
resources currently available to reduce emissions and to lessen 
vulnerability and enhance resilience. CPI (2013) estimates that 
total resources deployed to and in developing countries for 
climate change-related activities totalled $182 billion in 2012, 
with a combination of North-South transfers (in the range 
$39-62 billion) including both public and private resources – 
and the rest generated by developing countries themselves.
Taming the consequences of climate change and supporting 
development across the world are closely interlinked, yet 
the same cannot be said for their financing mechanisms 
and political drivers. Climate finance is often conceived as 
being shaped by the ‘polluter pays’ principle rather than by 
solidarity or ‘aid’, including policy-makers’ resistance to use 
traditional aid rules and principles (Mitchell and Maxwell, 
2010) such as those embedded in the declarations on aid and 
development effectiveness (Ellis et al., 2013).
Furthermore, the development impact of climate change 
funding has not received as much scrutiny as development 
assistance, which is understandable as most climate change 
funds are relatively recent and it might be too early to assess 
them.23 Finally, the Copenhagen Accord includes pledges of 
‘new and additional’ climate finance of $30 billion between 
2010 and 2012 (known as ‘fast-start’ finance, FSF) and $100 
billion each year by 2020 (‘long-term’ finance), expected to be 
adaptation funding targeting LDCs, SIDS and Africa.
The bottom line in the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) arena is that 
new pledges on climate finance should not come at the 
expense of resources for development programmes already 
in place (‘additional’) and should not recycle existing pledges 
(‘new’). The Copenhagen Accord, however, failed to define 
‘new and additional’, and this vacuum sparked a series of 
interpretations; a common tabular format for reporting a 
subset (the public component) of the $100 billion has been 
agreed only recently (see Caruso and Ellis, 2013).
Commitments of $30 billion between 2010 and 2012 by 
developed countries on FSF have been made (Nakhooda et 
al., 2013), considering funding from public sources only, with 
61% going to mitigation and 18% to adaptation projects.24
Nearly 80% of this $30 billion has been classified as ODA 
flows (Nakhooda et al., 2013). The rest of the funding is 
classified as OOF, export credit, guarantees and insurance, 
mainly to finance mitigation projects; adaptation measures 
were supported primarily by grant financing. Eleven countries 
are among the top 20 recipients of both FSF and ODA (see 
Table 4), and there is positive correlation between ODA 
receipts and FSF allocations, but by no means full overlap – 
and the differences in country allocations between the two 
streams adds importance to the division of ODA between 
them. While India and Indonesia, for example, are still 
receiving substantial absolute amounts of ODA, their relative 
shares of FSF are much higher. If this FSF distribution became 
representative of a much larger pool of international public 
finance mandated for climate change mitigation in the future, 
clearly the overall country balance of IPF for ‘sustainable 
development’ would shift quite dramatically.
Many OECD countries have expressed the view that 
climate financing, especially adaptation, and development 
financing are closely linked at the project level and impossible 
to separate (ee OECD 2013 submission to High Level 
Panel (HLP), World Bank 2010). Adaptation and resilience-
building activities within countries may be particularly 
difficult to distinguish from activities that contribute to ‘good 
development’ (Jones et al., 2012; Fankhauser and Burton, 
2011) and the strong overlap between ODA and FSF would 
call for moving beyond assessing ‘additionality’.25
Therefore, aside from reminding us of the imperative of 
mobilising more resources internationally if and when we 
can, the ‘additionality’ debate is ultimately a red herring. It 
is inevitable that some substantial share of climate change 
resources flowing from developed to developing countries 
will be sourced from public funds and will thus overlap with 
official development funding, whether on softer or harder 
terms. Equally, it is inevitable that some share of resources 
from developed to developing countries will be sourced from 
private sources and so overlap with private investments in 
infrastructure and other components of green growth. Both 
sources of finance should be welcomed.
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Table 4. Top 20 countries FSF and gross ODA 2010-2012
Total FSD 
2010-2012
Share of total 
FSF (%)
ODA commitments 
(const 2012 USD)  
2010-2012
Share of total ODA 
commitments (%)
1 India 5,610 17.6 India 21,011 4.8
2 Indonesia 2,696 8.5 Afghanistan 20,861 4.8
3 Brazil 1,611 5.1 Vietnam 15,452 3.6
4 Vietnam 1,042 3.3 Pakistan 12,835 3.0
5 Kenya 918 2.9 Congo,	Dem.	Rep. 12,163 2.8
6 Peru 509 1.6 Kenya 11,701 2.7
7 Thailand 469 1.5 Ethiopia 11,253 2.6
8 Philippines 402 1.3 Bangladesh 11,058 2.6
9 Egypt, Arab Rep. 386 1.2 Turkey 9,404 2.2
10 Pakistan 378 1.2 Tanzania 8,309 1.9
11 Malawi 376 1.2 Haiti 7,871 1.8
12 Bangladesh 357 1.1 Morocco 7,488 1.7
13 South	Africa 295 0.9 Indonesia 6,818 1.6
14 Tanzania 260 0.8 Jordan 6,810 1.6
15 China 244 0.8 Egypt 6,781 1.6
16 Uzbekistan 239 0.8 Nigeria 6,646 1.5
17 Afghanistan 237 0.7 West	Bank	&	Gaza	Strip 6,627 1.5
18 Mexico 233 0.7 Mozambique 6,065 1.4
19 Ethiopia 223 0.7 China 5,931 1.4
20 Honduras 202 0.6 Iraq 5,789 1.3
For as long as public concessional assistance remains 
heavily rationed, we recommend the following:
First, to prioritise adaptation financing as far as possible 
from country aid budgets (with the latter taken as meaning 
CPA). As already internationally agreed, adaptation assistance 
should anyway target countries most vulnerable to damage 
from irreversible climate change, such as LDCs and SIDS.
Second, in creditworthy countries, where some investments 
consistent with a low-carbon emissions growth pattern are 
not yet commercially viable but mitigation is clearly in the 
national as well as global public interest, the answer is to 
make such investments possible with carefully targeted public 
support, mostly in the form of guarantees or publicly backed 
loans on market-related terms. This route is particularly 
relevant when interest rates are low and are expected to stay 
that way (see Section 1). Exceptions to this rule should be 
made only for LDCs and SIDS and other least creditworthy 
countries, which mostly do not yet offer major opportunities 
for emissions reductions but may need support to pilot new 
approaches.
Compared with current practice, this will mean channelling 
a much larger share of grant-based adaptation aid to LDCs 
and SIDS (just 38% of FSF for adaptation was disbursed to 
LDCs and SIDSs, based on Nakhooda et al., 2013), as is the 
case for other forms of ODA. Establishing an explicit target 
for the share of adaptation finance going to these country 
groups could create positive incentives, and at the same time 
make it more likely that existing UN sub-targets for ODA 
to LDCs are met, given the high degree of intrinsic purpose 
overlap between adaptation and development.
This approach presumes, however, that there are sufficient 
non-concessional (or less-concessional) resources available for 
mitigation in MICs, and for this the world will be looking in 
particular to expanding the role, and capital base, of MDBs. 
This assumption presents its own set of policy problems, to 
which we now turn.
Source: Nakhooda et al. (2013 and OECD 2014). Countries that are among both top 20 FSF and ODA recipient countries are indicated in bold. 
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Summary:
We consider here the role of the MDBs, and in particular 
their ‘harder’ or market-terms windows. Net lending has 
been flat or negative for decades. It is not yet clear whether 
this stagnation is primarily the result of supply-side capital 
constraints, or if it also results from a lack of effective 
demand from borrowers, perhaps exacerbated by the 
institutions’ cumbersome processes and/or onerous non-
financial conditions. However, there is substantial indirect 
evidence – considering country borrowing preferences, 
the creation of new institutions in competition with them, 
and the sustained surge in international infrastructure 
investments – that there is still plenty of need for the jobs 
they were created to do. An independent review should 
seek to establish this balance and recommend corrective 
action. Funding for the MDBs anyway needs to be 
looked at in the round, not in outdated silos for different 
‘windows’, especially in a favourable global interest rate 
environment, and it needs to be extricated from self-
defeating polemics.
We have shown in Section 3 how countries ‘graduating’ 
into LMIC status face sharply reduced concessional 
assistance but can expect only gradually increasing tax 
revenues and not enough market-based finance at the right 
time – hence the ‘missing middle’ of development finance 
available to them at this specific pinch point.
In theory, that is precisely why the so-called ‘market 
terms’ windows of the MDBs exist: to help these 
countries bridge their transition towards greater and 
ultimately full market access as growth prospects and 
institutional strength improve. As a matter of practice, 
however, official non-concessional flows (bilateral and 
multilateral) to developing countries no longer play 
this role to a significant degree. Total net disbursements 
reached a sizeable $56 billion in 1983 but then steadily 
declined to become negative in 1995, whilst the number 
of countries reaching middle-income status grew steadily. 
Disbursements rose significantly for three years after the 
Asian debt crisis, before again returning to large negative 
flows. The same pattern has repeated since 2000: large 
negative net official flows, except for exceptional responses 
in 2009 and 2010 to the Great Recession. Most recent data 
for 2013 show net official flows of negative $45 billion.26
Why exactly this erosion has occurred is not completely 
clear. There is some evidence at country level (Greenhill et 
al., 2013; OECD, forthcoming) that countries eligible for 
these windows, and even softer loans,27 are opting instead, 
at the margin, for significantly higher-interest international 
borrowing, notably from bilateral export credit agencies 
and sovereign bond markets. This situation may result 
partly from borrowers being deterred by the significantly 
higher non-financial costs of MDB loans and credits (such 
as allegedly intrusive political conditions, cumbersome 
safeguards and slow or unreliable processes). Borrowers 
may also feel they get more valuable reputational 
(signalling) benefits from tapping financial markets 
periodically in their own name than they do from going the 
indirect MDB route.
At the same time, there may be a variety of restrictions 
in the maximum envelopes, or earmarks within them, 
actually available from MDBs at country level. These 
restrictions might result from the institutions’ formal 
fiduciary policies and their methods of country risk 
and debt sustainability assessment, as well as less 
formal patterns of staff capacities, internal culture, and 
management preferences and political accessibility at 
various levels. Some of this information is neither in 
the public domain nor necessarily known to borrowing 
governments, who therefore would be acting rationally 
in heavily discounting estimates of how much they can 
actually draw down.
Some combination of these factors is intuitively 
plausible, but because the country and global demand 
for these institutions’ loans has never been independently 
assessed and then compared with their capital base, 
fiduciary rules and other institutional features, nobody 
(not even their boards) can presumably reach an objective, 
evidence-based conclusion on where this balance between 
demand-side and supply-side factors lies. The World Bank’s 
president has, however, recently stated (World Bank press 
release, April 2014) that IBRD can deliver another $10 
billion a year in loans without recourse to additional paid-
in capital, mainly by changing fiduciary limits, maturities 
and other terms. This implies that there is no binding 
demand-side constraint.
Section 5: Institutional bottlenecks to 
be addressed internationally: reverse 
the erosion of non-concessional MDB 
lending
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This secular decline problem is aggravated by the 
peculiar set of threshold effects or ‘hard stops’ created at 
the boundaries of concessional (IDA) and non-concessional 
(IBRD) loan eligibility and their regional equivalents (Asia 
Development Fund/Asian Development Bank, etc.).
Behind the scenes, the uncomfortable truth is that more 
effort has been given to raising grants than to leveraging 
grant funds into larger volumes, albeit at higher financial 
cost. For example, IDA has raised $225 billion from 
its shareholders since its inception, whereas IBRD has 
obtained less than $17 billion28 in paid-in capital from 
shareholders over the same period (Morris, 2014). And 
shareholder pressures are for even more transfers of funds 
from IBRD and the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) to IDA. The same is true for other multilateral and 
bilateral institutions.
However, with plentiful liquidity in global capital 
markets, now could be the best time for years to reconsider 
the advantages of leveraging grants with private capital 
through development banks versus transferring them 
directly to developing countries (Kharas, 2014 blog 
reference). The number of MICs wanting to access 
cheap, flexible capital for development investments is 
growing, and capital market conditions for increasing 
supply are favourable. Several development banks are 
preparing options to do this, of which the most advanced 
is the ADB’s recent decision in principle to leverage the 
receivables in its soft window to improve its overall equity 
base. This technique, or variants of it, holds promise 
and deserves consideration by other institutions and the 
international community. However, each MDB is currently 
making progress independently, outside of any systemic or 
aggregate perspective for the global financial architecture.
Why then is additional capital for MDBs apparently so 
hard to raise? This relates partly to the damaging political 
perception – especially, but not only in the United States 
– that these institutions fund countries like China, India 
and Brazil, who are the OECD’s direct global competitors, 
and partly to the perception that MDBs are not aggressive 
enough in enforcing ‘developed country’ social and 
environmental standards.
In response, developing countries are creating their own 
purpose-built bilateral, regional-bilateral and multilateral 
institutions to provide market-based public lending. 
Several have long and successful track records, like the 
Andean Development Cooperation (CAF) and the Central 
American Development Bank, and others are more recent, 
like the Eurasian Development Bank. The newest of these 
is the BRICS’ New Development Bank ($50 billion initial 
capital, pledged but not yet mobilised), and others are 
under discussion or have just been formally launched 
(an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a South Asia 
Development Bank). These agencies offer borrowing 
countries alternative funding choices, and potentially 
higher aggregate volumes of funding on keen terms, 
both of which are good things, but are unlikely to be of 
sufficient magnitude to address the funding shortfalls in 
developing countries. (UNCTAD, 2013)
These key facts – that (1) there are huge investments 
under consideration and feasible plans to deliver them; 
(2) several new institutions are being capitalised to service 
them, at considerable political, financial and organisational 
effort; and (3) developing countries are clearly willing to 
pay a large premium to access additional funding – add 
up to a strong and urgent rationale to try to unlock the 
MDBs’ own capital and unleash their performance.
We turn now to a specific set of reform recommenda-
tions, first for MDBs as a subsystem, and then more 
broadly.
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This section draws on the preceding ones to identify a few 
key arrangements and metrics that might be agreed within, 
or immediately following, international meetings such 
as the 2015 Conference on Financing for Development 
in Addis Ababa, intended to significantly improve the 
reach, complementarity and/or effectiveness of resource 
mobilisation efforts for the new SDGs.
They are filtered so as to offer the prospect of the lowest 
possible transactional and political costs in respect of 
potential benefits, yet not to duplicate existing proposals 
placed before international bodies.
We organise our own recommendations by objective, 
into four categories.
1.  Boost market-terms lending by MDBs 
(rationale as in Section 5)
 • Carry out an independent review of the likely future 
demand for non-concessional external finance and the 
strategic role of MDBs within this, especially in LMICs, 
with a view to eliminating the ‘missing middle’ funding 
gap.
 • Consider mechanisms to leverage the receivables in 
the ‘soft’ windows of the MDBs to accelerate resource 
transfers in the near and medium term.
 • Review and smooth – make more predictable and 
transparent – the process of graduating from IDA-type 
terms to ‘blend’ and then IBRD-type terms.
 • Address MDB non-financial competitive weaknesses in 
delivery (speed, flexibility, communications gaps, etc.).
Comment: We hesitate to assign specific international 
responsibilities for carrying out these actions. Clearly 
‘independent’ should mean as a minimum separate from 
the direct interests of the management and boards of the 
MDBs themselves. However, the process has to be seen as 
legitimate by all major stakeholders, as well as technically 
competent. For example, it will need to factor in the likely 
systemic changes brought to bear by recently created 
regional and/or bilateral-based development banks. Hence 
there is the obvious option of oversight by the G20, whose 
membership closely maps that of all these institutions’ 
main owners, but perhaps assisted by the UN to canvass 
borrower opinion beyond the G20 membership. The other 
three actions, once properly framed by the first, are within 
the scope of responsibility of the MDBs themselves, with 
periodic reporting back to the G20 and UN.
2.  Boost access to market-related public 
finance more generally
2A.  Agree on a new international indicator for ‘official 
finance’ (OF)
Comment: This would be without prejudice to, and in 
addition to, existing ODA commitments (0.7% of GNI, 
LDC sub-target 0.15 - 0.2% of GNI). 
The idea is to report as ‘OF’ the face value of all official 
market-related loans that are not already counted as 
ODA (see Glossary). This is a similar approach to that 
currently taken for other official flows (OOF) as reported 
by DAC countries and some non-DAC countries. The main 
disincentives to reporting more loans on the OOF basis, 
and increasing their volume, are, for DAC members in 
particular, that there is no target for OOF as there is for 
ODA. Conversely, for many non-DAC countries, as they 
reject the ODA categorisation (along with the obsolete 
North-South lexicon of ‘aid’, ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’) as 
applying to them at all, by implication OOF, identified 
implicitly as that which is surplus to ODA, has limited 
appeal also.
The new metric should be as simple and liberally defined 
as possible, to encourage all providers to self-report, take 
credit for and ultimately increase their relevant activities, 
sidestepping unhelpful terms like ‘aid’ and ‘concessional’. It 
should not discriminate loans by their stated purpose (e.g. 
‘development’ versus ‘investment promotion’). It should 
recognise as a separate subcategory the disbursements 
by multilateral and regional development bank loans. 
Reporting should be built up from date already submitted 
by member countries to the IMF and World Bank (who 
already compile global data on such loans, but are 
restricted in what they can report) as well as the DAC 
Secretariat.
The only possible restriction would be that the terms 
offered are plausibly more favourable than market 
offerings. The latter ceiling might be set as the borrowing 
country’s latest sovereign bond coupon, or even just a flat  
rate, say 10%. In practice it is highly unlikely that official 
lenders would charge rates at or above those offered 
commercially for the same risk (or that borrowers would 
be willing to pay them when the alternative exists).
2B. Set a new UN-agreed international target for OF 
After a pilot phase in which voluntary self-reporting of OF 
is tested, it should be associated with a new UN-agreed 
international target (say, 1% of developing countries’ 
Section 6: Specific recommendations  
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GDP or $230 billion in 2012). Such a target, based on 
needs for sustainable infrastructure in particular, is more 
aspirational and relevant than one potentially based on 
contribution shares on the part of advanced and emerging 
market economies. Note, however, that just 0.5% of G7 
GDP would today already amount to about $170 billion. 
By some recent measures, the combined economies of the 
BRICs, plus Mexico, Indonesia and Turkey, are already 
of comparable if not larger size, making the 1% target 
eminently achievable.  
Comment: The precise split between ODA and OF is 
of no pressing concern from a user country perspective, 
especially given current favourable terms on market-
related financing. What “missing middle” countries, in 
particular, need now is much greater access to funding 
on market-related terms, from all quarters, including 
non-DAC countries. That is the main purpose of setting an 
international OF target. 
This perspective is distinct from the more complex 
deliberations within the DAC of how to ‘modernise’ ODA 
as a measure of donor effort. DAC is reportedly close to 
reaching agreement on a new standard for loans scoring 
as ODA. The leading option is based on counting as ODA 
the entire grant element of official loans for development 
purposes, using a differentiated set of discount rates, 
depending on lender market conditions and/or borrowing 
country risk categories.29
A parallel DAC proposal (see Glossary) is that once the 
grant element is fully counted as ODA, the remainder of 
the loan counts towards a new aggregate. This measure, 
tentatively styled total official support for development 
(TOSD), would also include other items, such as some 
security spending beyond that allowed under ODA. 
 Note that no targets for TOSD are planned, as yet. 
The old OOF aggregate also disappears under this 
arrangement, making it all the more useful to have a new 
UN-based OF definition.
3.  Incentivise private finance and align it with 
development objectives
3A.  Agree on basic definitions and metrics for private 
finance for development (PFFD)
Comment: The absence of clarity on this point encourages 
confusing, sometimes excessive and unaccountable claims. 
It distracts from the two key objectives of relaxing country 
credit constraints by encouraging more private finance and 
creating conditions so that investments bring about both 
profits and sustainable development.
 A competent and legitimately convened working 
group should lead this work, preferably including UN, 
international financial institutions and other bodies, such 
as the DAC, as well as representatives from the private and 
impact philanthropy sectors.
As a minimum, we should agree that when international 
public finance gives comfort to international private 
investors or commercial lenders, in a public-private 
partnership for example, the face value of the private 
investment that public stake supports (in any fashion) 
should be counted as a distinct part of PFFD, whereas 
the public instrument involved should be part of ODA or 
OF, depending on its terms (see 3B below for treatment of 
guarantees). 
PFFD should also preferably include disbursements 
of private voluntary commitments made under global 
partnerships established to support the SDGs, private 
investments consistent with national development plans 
(and reported as such by host countries), and social impact 
investments. It should ideally include all international 
private financing undertaken by national and sub-national 
governments or their agencies to finance budget deficits 
or other development spending categories as defined 
by ICESDF. It should also include international private 
philanthropy.
In the case of partnerships where more than one public 
agency is involved, they will need to apportion their claims 
to be catalysing the relevant part of PFFD accordingly. 
Preferably this work should also set some standards 
to help gauge threshold levels of associated public stakes 
(minor equity holdings, technical assistance grants in 
kind) without which a largely private project would not 
otherwise have materialised, in the likely absence of a 
counterfactual where an investment is planned without 
such a stake.
As this work proceeds, it should also consider the pros 
and cons of establishing some form of ‘PFFD leverage 
targets’ to be set by those agencies that work with the 
private sector, as a share of their non-concessional flows 
or OF, to encourage them to use more risk-bearing 
instruments (see also our Market Aid Index, Section 2). 
The leverage target should not include any flows mobilised 
from other public agencies. Care of course needs to be 
taken to avoid encouraging perverse behaviour, such as 
attaching the smallest possible public sums to the largest 
possible private projects, which at the margin becomes 
totally ineffectual.
3B.  Give explicit credit (including in ODA and/or OF) 
for undisbursed guarantees and other contingent 
commitments
Comment: It is an irony that, as things stand, guarantees 
are scored as ODA only when called and disbursed – which 
usually means that the relevant investment has failed – but 
not in relatively successful cases, when the guarantee is 
arguably having its intended confidence-building effect. 
There are accounting issues here, but most national 
accounting offices (such as the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) in the USA) already have tools to assess the 
implicit budgetary cost of a guarantee. This cost should 
ideally be included as ODA, unless the lender pays for it, 
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in which case it would be OF.30 All private investments 
in projects that are supported by even a small amount of 
a guarantee from a public development agency should 
be counted as PFFD, as the project will be, by definition, 
contributing to sustainable development (otherwise there is 
no case for the public intervention).
A possible extension of this approach would be to score 
some portion of all contingent commitments (such as the 
Advanced Market Commitment for pneumococcal vaccines 
administered by the GAVI Alliance), which are a set of 
‘prizes’ or rewards for future action, payable on specific 
results triggers, even if the prize is not in the end collected 
in full. Care should however be taken to avoid creating 
unintended disincentives to making advance commitments, 
if scoring them as ODA up front crowds out cash outlays 
today on the part of agencies that are close to their ODA 
spending limits.
 The key in both areas is to incentivise more recourse 
to innovative risk-mitigation interventions, which do not 
involve immediate cash outlays, but are likely to be an 
effective and leveraged use of public finance.
4.  Minimise the allocation distortions inherent 
in international public finance for climate 
mitigation
4A.  Isolate public climate change mitigation finance 
from country aid budgets and finance it mainly with 
non-concessional instruments
Comment: Whilst undesirable within a more narrow 
country-based development approach (because it will 
create or aggravate allocation distortions, see Section 
4) pressures to use development aid budgets for climate 
change mitigation in developing countries are both 
politically unavoidable and legitimate. This is both because 
such funding must be an integral part of a larger global 
public good solution, and because failure to act globally 
will ultimately damage development prospects everywhere, 
even in poorer countries with a very low carbon footprint.
We therefore propose that as a fallback, until major 
truly additional sources of funding become available, all 
providers of concessional assistance clearly demarcate the 
grant element of mitigation-related assistance separately 
from their country aid budgets. These would continue to 
contain allocations for climate change adaptation support 
targeted to the most vulnerable countries, such as LDC 
and SIDS. Adaptation is at best a national or regional, 
not global, public good and is inextricably linked to 
development programmes and to vulnerability, as well as 
the historical ‘polluter pays’ principle.
Mitigation should also be funded primarily on non-
concessional terms at prevailing low real interest rates 
(taking care not to crowd out the capital needs of MDBs 
for their other clients and purposes, as discussed above) as 
the majority of needed investments that may not be funded 
on purely commercial terms are in the national as well as 
global public interest. There should be limited exceptions 
for applying grant assistance for demonstration activities in 
LDCs and SIDS (Section 4)
Where possible, the bulk of the residual grant element 
for mitigation (not necessarily the face value of such loans) 
should be reserved for LDCs, SIDS and other countries 
lacking access to capital; this has some overlap with 
present practice (Section 4), but needs to be monitored 
carefully in the future, given the sheer scale of mitigation 
needs as compared to development and adaptation ones.
4B.  Establish a new target for the share of concessional 
assistance for adaptation going to LDCs and SIDS
Comment: A starting point for this discussion could be 
a minimum share of 50% of climate change adaptation 
ODA going to these country groups. Intrinsically, most 
concessional assistance for adaptation should be focused 
on the most vulnerable countries (such as SIDS and LDCs), 
as also foreseen, for example, in the Copenhagen Accord. 
In practice, only some 38% of FSF for adaptation was 
subsequently so allocated (Section 4), so the 50% target 
is not as trivial as it may seem. Such a target would also 
reinforce, indirectly, the UN target of ODA for LDCs as a 
share of donor incomes (0.15%-0.2%).
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The new normal in the international development 
community is to emphasise action with the private sector, 
for example via catalytic deployment of public resources, 
blended public-private instruments, and public-private 
partnerships. The private sector consists of a diverse 
set of actors, including foundations, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), businesses and social impact 
entrepreneurs. All are far more active development actors 
than even ten years ago.
We have suggested, in this report, some key areas where 
this trend can and should be accelerated, notably through 
the following: guarantees and contingent finance; action to 
boost the stagnant intermediation capacity of development 
banks in favour of MICs with restricted market access; 
action to align private profit-making and social objectives 
with development objectives; and support of climate 
change mitigation through loans linked to technology 
transfer.
However, we should flag some inherent limits to this 
enthusiasm for the twinning of public and private finance.
Analytically, international public finance, whether 
counted as aid or not, could be deployed either (a) mainly 
in countries and sectors where the private sector is not 
engaged, or, conversely, (b) mainly in those where it is in 
ever closer association with it. The first approach (after 
Rogerson, 2014) we might term ‘oil and water’ – keep the 
aid oil separate from the rest – and the second ‘sugar and 
water’ – allow the aid sugar to dissolve entirely in a very 
weak solution. 
 The number of quintessential ‘oil and water’ countries, 
where there is simply no alternative, and their populations 
have shrunk (section 3), and are expected to continue to 
shrink over time, as proportions of the developing country 
totals. That trend creates a political economy dilemma, 
as much more public money, in the pure oil and water 
paradigm, ends up chasing fewer people, and, to boot, 
in places with relatively bad track records of using such 
funding effectively. 
 Proponents of the first (oil) approach nonetheless see a 
need to programme the bulk of international public finance 
budgets separately, to target areas of greatest need and 
to fill gaps they believe the private sector is not likely to 
reach, at least in the short and medium terms. They also 
argue that it is difficult to demonstrate that public support 
to private investment is actually essential, catalytic, or 
transformative, and that it is more likely that some of it 
will subsidise private schemes that would have happened 
regardless.
Proponents of the second (sugar) approach point to the 
leveraging effect of such public support, to its relevance 
in MICs where most of the world’s poor still live, and to 
the greater dynamism, creativity and cost-effectiveness 
of private actors in solving a wide and growing range of 
development problems, including in the area of ‘public’ 
services like health and education. They also argue that the 
slow speed of progress with the first (oil) approach requires 
a radical departure from ‘business as usual’. And that 
international public finance can simply displace domestic 
taxes that could have funded similar items, without the 
foreign intervention.
In the end, proponents of both approaches are right to 
some degree. (This black-and-white picture clearly needs 
to be differentiated by country as well as by sector or 
thematic focus, and country MDG costing and financing 
plans need to explore trade-offs, see Section 2).
 The bigger practical challenge is that a balance 
eventually needs to be struck on one side or the other, 
assuming funding, political support and management 
capacity are not sufficiently abundant enough to execute 
both oil and sugar strategies equally well. And they are 
almost certainly not.
The typical public agency charged with international 
public finance allocation, still mostly comprising civil 
servants, probably lacks the capacity to scale up its 
‘leveraging’ action very quickly and at the same time 
continue its public-public line of action. The latter is 
especially demanding in the case of complex, sensitive and 
time-consuming efforts towards state-building and the 
delivery of essential services in the hardest and most fragile 
contexts. It includes the challenge of actually achieving 
threshold improvements in rule of law which have wider 
catalytic effects on the country’s access to private finance 
(Section 1).
For sure, the public agency can sub-contract the 
sugar (public-private leveraging) track more and more 
to semi-private and professional bodies, such as national 
and international Development Finance Institutions, as 
many countries are doing. There are, however, significant 
reputational and fiduciary risks, and potentially high 
future recurrent costs, inherent in ramping up the blended 
approach, which the phrase ‘Bureaucrats in Business’, 
Section 7: Concluding remarks: 
balancing international public-private 
roles across and within countries
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referring originally to state enterprise management in 
developing countries, well encapsulates.
We have tried to steer a middle course through this 
conundrum, reflecting the growing differentiation among 
developing countries and the growing opportunities for 
collaboration with the private sector in different contexts.
Our main proposed approach is, in a capsule, to:
(a)  Prioritise international public finance across 
countries (in grant-equivalent terms) primarily on 
the basis of their vulnerability, low creditworthiness 
and lack of fiscal capacity, but then
(b)  within these countries, focus efforts as much as 
possible on crowding in other actors, both directly 
(through blended approaches, contracting services, 
etc.) and indirectly (by focusing state-building on, in 
particular, rule-of-law improvements and domestic 
resource mobilisation likely to expand future access 
to other sources of finance).
(c)  Expand public non-concessional flows (OF) to 
thematic areas where substantial private finance 
can be catalysed, especially in MICs, and incentivise 
international financial institutions to leverage more 
private capital through explicit counting of a new 
category of flows that we call private finance for 
development.
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Each horizontal line in Figures A1 to A5 reflects the 
average value of one of the following financing flows 
as a share of GDP for the years 2011 and 2012 along 
the spectrum of per capita GDP in USD (current values; 
lntransformation): ODA flows (net ODA – grants and 
loans) and OOF (net) both from OECD.Stat; net FDI 
inflows (World Bank World Development Indicators); 
net workers’ remittances received (World Bank World 
Development Indicators), and tax revenues (World Bank 
World Development Indicators).
For example, data points corresponding to per capita 
income – let’s say of $1,000 – are average values for 
all the countries in 2011 and 2012 whose per capita 
income was at $1,000. The same logic applies to all levels 
of per capita GDP. For the sake of clarity, the figures 
omit the distribution for each flow around its mean. 
ERD (forthcoming 2015) takes a different perspective, 
considering long-term trends since 1990.
We use a local polynomial smoothing technique for 
each variable (Epanechnikov function). Results are robust, 
also taking a longer-term perspective (since 1990). The 
curve reflecting total flows in each graph follows the same 
methodology and it is not the sum of each flow depicted in 
the graph but the polynomial smoothed line of total flows 
for each country.
Annex 1: Methodology for analysis 
of evolution of development finance 
flows by income per capita
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Source: World Development Indicators and OECD.stat.
Note:  We included countries whose annual income per capita was above $350 (because of data availability on Tax Revenues) and below $90,000. Outliers 
for 2011 and 2012 for FDI flows (Mauritius and Iceland) were omitted from the analysis. We also excluded countries whose tax revenue to GDP ratio 
was reported to be below 1% (Kuwait and United Arab Emirates).
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Figure A 3. Comparison foreign direct investment and GDP per capita
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Source: OECD.Stat and World Development Indicators.
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46 Financing the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals
6
-10
0
0
10
10
20
20
30
30
40
40
8 10 12
6 8 9 10 117
GDP per capita (log)
GDP per capita (log)
%
 G
DP
Figure A 4. Comparison remittances and GDP per capita
Figure A 5. Comparison tax revenues and GDP per capita 
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The Market Aid Index is based on analysis for a range of 
OECD countries of (1) the share of their ODA focused 
on private sector development and (2) the share of their 
total official flows (ODA plus OOF) which consists of 
OOF. Background/definitional issues and methodological 
approaches for utilising these two categories of aid flows 
are presented below:
i) Share of ODA focused on private sector development
The OECD’s Creditor Reporting system (CRS) for 
monitoring the use of ODA does not include a category 
‘private sector development’, and therefore this category 
was approximated based on selecting the ODA sector 
categories which are most relevant. We selected the 
following CRS sector categories to include under our 
‘private sector development’ category based on the fact 
that the private sector could reasonably be expected to be 
the leading actor or main partner for ODA in these sectors:
Economic infrastructure and services (sector code 200)
 • Transport and storage (210) – all sub-sectors except 
transport policy and admin (21010), road transport 
(21020) and education/training in transport and storage 
(21081)
 • Communications (220) – all sub-sectors except 
communications policy and admin (22010)
 • Energy (230) – all sub-sectors except energy policy and 
admin (23010), energy education/training (23081) and 
energy research (23082)
 • Banking and financial services (240) – all sub-sectors 
except financial policy and admin (24010), monetary 
institutions (24020) and education/training in banking 
and financial services (24081)
 • Business support services and institutions (250) – all 
sub-sectors
Production sectors (sector code 300)
 • Agriculture (311) – all sub-sectors except agricultural 
policy and admin management (31110), agricultural 
extension (31166), agricultural education/training 
(31181) and agricultural research (31182)
 • Forestry (312) – all sub-sectors except forestry policy 
and admin management (31210), forestry education/
training (31281) and forestry research (31282)
 • Fishing (313) – all sub-sectors except fishing policy and 
admin management (31310), fishery education/training 
(31381) and fishery research (31382)
 • Industry (321) – all sub-sectors except industrial policy 
and admin management (32110) and technological 
research and development (32182)
 • Mineral resources and mining (322) – all sub-sectors 
except mineral/mining policy and admin management 
(32210)
 • Trade policies and regulations (331) – all sub-sectors
 • Tourism (332) – all sub-sectors
CALCULATING THE FIGURE FOR THE INDEX – On 
this basis the aggregate figure was then calculated for 
gross ODA to the private sector during 2009-2012 for 
each OECD country, and then divided by total gross ODA 
during 2009-2012 from each OECD country. This results 
in a score of from 0 to 1 (which could be multiplied by 100 
to produce a percentage figure) for each OECD country.
ii)  Share of OOF in total official flows (ODA plus OOF)
OOFs are defined as ‘transactions by the official sector 
with countries on the List of Aid Recipients which do not 
meet the conditions for eligibility as ODA or Official Aid.’ 
We utilised this category of flows as the numerator for the 
second part of our catalytic index on the basis of assuming 
that OOF are mainly provided to/utilised in cooperation 
with the private sector.
The data for OOF were collected from the OECD’s 
database on these flows. It should be noted, however, 
that this source does not capture all OOF from OECD 
countries to developing countries, as not all relevant 
institutions providing such assistance report their data 
to the OECD, and the data also do not accurately reflect 
the shares of flows from multilateral development finance 
institutions that can be attributed to the support of OECD 
Governments.
CALCULATING THE FIGURE FOR THE INDEX – The 
aggregate figure was calculated for gross OOF during 
2009-2012 for each OECD country, and then divided 
by total official flows – ODA + OOF during 2009-2012 
– from each OECD country. This results in a score from 
0 and 1 (which could be multiplied by 100 to produce 
a percentage figure) for each OECD country. Table A 1 
reports the actual shares for both components.
Annex 2: Methodology for  
Market Aid Index
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Table A 1. Share of ODA to the private sector and OOF as a 
share of total official finance
Share of ODA to the 
private sector (%)
OOF as share of 
OF(%)
Australia 4.8 8.3
Austria 8.8 25.0
Belgium 15.9 4.1
Canada 10.9 55.2
Denmark 13.4 1.9
Finland 13.4 28.1
France 11.4 10.6
Germany 25.3 13.0
Greece 1.2 0.0
Ireland 8.3 0.0
Italy 9.2 9.2
Japan 30.8 43.0
Republic	of	South	Korea 21.2 81.3
Luxembourg 7.5 0.0
Netherlands 11.5 0.0
New	Zealand 16.1 3.0
Norway 12.4 0.0
Portugal 6.2 0.1
Spain 18.4 0.1
Sweden 7.7 1.3
Switzerland 8.6 0.0
United	Kingdom 11.5 0.3
United	States 8.2 9.7
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the basis of OECD (2014).
Producing the final index
The final index for each OECD country was then produced 
by normalising and summing their score for each category 
of flows. These normalised figures were produced by 
utilising the following formula:
where X is the actual value for the OECD country, and 
X min and X max the minimum and maximum value for 
OECD countries for that component.
Note: It had been hoped to include recently compiled data 
from the OECD on the flows to/in developing countries 
mobilised by their members from guarantees for the 
private sector as a third element of this index. However, the 
process and methodology for gathering this data was only 
recently utilised for the first time, and from reviewing the 
results there seem to be some very significant gaps in the 
data. It was therefore decided not to include them in this 
version of the catalytic aid index, but it would be valuable 
to include them in any future iterations.
X – Xmin
Xmax – Xmin
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Marginal tax rates are based on $1.25 PPP/day poverty gap. The methodology is based on Ravallion (2009). 
Annex 3: Marginal tax rates
Table A 2. Marginal tax rates
Country Survey year Inc/Con Mean ($) Pov. gap (1.25$) % Pov. gap ($13) % Marginal tax rate
Albania 2012 C 181.78 0.1 55.39 0.71
Algeria 1995 C 122.25 1.27 69.6 23.63
Angola 2008.5 C 59.84 16.45 84.94 100.00
Argentina--Urban 2011 I 466.64 0.78 25.96 0.17
Armenia 2012 C 118.7 0.31 70.7 4.15
Azerbaijan 2008 C 214.04 0.12 50.38 0.26
Bangladesh 2010 C 51.67 11.17 86.97 100.00
Belarus 2011 C 508.81 0 9.89 0.00
Belize 1999 I 191.4 5.52 62.11 5.05
Benin 2011.5 C 54.68 18.82 86.41 100.00
Bhutan 2012 C 154.55 0.37 63.86 1.21
Bolivia 2012 I 276.25 4.2 45.4 2.65
Bosnia	and	Herzegovina 2007 C 521.89 0.01 14.08 0.00
Botswana 2009.3 C 225.72 3.95 61.4 2.05
Brazil 2012 I 418.24 2.14 36.26 0.49
Bulgaria 2011 I 329.77 0.81 31.21 0.53
Burkina	Faso 2009 C 56.28 14.59 86.12 100.00
Burundi 2006 C 28.96 36.39 100 47.78
Cambodia 2011 C 84.4 1.43 78.98 42.36
Cameroon 2007 C 79.73 7.24 80.15 100.00
Cape	Verde 2007.5 C 115.72 3.18 73.02 13.38
Central	African	Republic 2008 C 51.28 31.26 89.03 100.00
Chad 2011 C 67.79 14.18 83.1 100.00
Chile 2011 I 513.41 0.38 28.21 0.06
China 2010 C 160.16 2.03 63.27 5.17
Colombia 2012 I 308.7 2.33 47.11 0.89
Comoros 2004 C 94.4 20.82 83.01 29.08
Congo,	Dem.	Rep. 2005.5 C 21.74 52.76 100 92.27
Congo,	Rep. 2011 C 69.57 11.47 82.74 100.00
Costa	Rica 2012 I 493.21 0.58 28.21 0.11
Croatia 2008 C 671.62 0 6.8 0.00
Czech	Republic 2011 I 680.73 0.06 4.1 0.01
Côte	d’Ivoire 2008 C 70.82 12.68 82.4 100.00
Djibouti 2002 C 93.52 5.29 77.04 73.61
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Country Survey year Inc/Con Mean ($) Pov. gap (1.25$) % Pov. gap ($13) % Marginal tax rate
Dominican	Republic 2012 I 247.32 0.6 50.28 0.45
Ecuador 2012 I 287.54 1.8 44.8 0.99
Egypt,	Arab	Rep. 2008.3 C 114.02 0.37 72.46 2.75
El	Salvador 2012 I 216.37 0.56 53.06 0.69
Estonia 2011 I 539.42 1.18 12.44 0.23
Ethiopia 2010.5 C 55.44 10.39 86.24 100.00
Fiji 2008.5 C 141.01 1.14 68.2 2.84
Gabon 2005 C 150.22 1.25 65.55 3.39
Gambia,	The 2003 C 81.89 11.69 80.42 99.49
Georgia 2012 C 115.68 4.53 71.97 35.55
Ghana 2005.5 C 80.25 9.88 80.3 100.00
Guatemala 2011 I 156.75 4.78 67.51 6.43
Guinea-Bissau 2002 C 48.38 16.55 87.77 100.00
Guinea 2012 C 52.83 12.7 100 9.14
Guyana 1998 I 180.14 2.77 60.26 4.58
Haiti 2001 I 55.53 32.31 87.16 100.00
Honduras 2011 I 189.7 7.21 63.95 5.81
Hungary 2011 I 443.42 0.05 15.8 0.02
India 2009.5 C 60.34 7.49 85.03 100.00
Indonesia 2010 C 82.77 3.28 88.75 3.26
Iran,	Islamic	Rep. 2005 C 197.67 0.34 54.9 0.67
Iraq 2012 C 105.96 0.64 73.4 31.23
Jamaica 2004 C 274.33 0.02 46.57 0.01
Jordan 2010 C 214.31 0.02 50.82 0.04
Kazakhstan 2010 C 215.31 0.01 48.6 0.03
Kenya 2005.4 C 65.47 16.91 84.54 100.00
Kyrgyz	Republic 2011 C 116.34 1.18 71.11 21.32
Lao	PDR 2012 C 66.18 7.66 83.6 100.00
Latvia 2011 I 426.08 0.95 22.48 0.30
Lesotho 2010 C 54.89 29.17 86.53 100.00
Liberia 2007 C 27.14 40.9 93.25 100.00
Lithuania 2011 I 447.92 0.81 18.47 0.25
Macedonia,	FYR 2008 C 295.42 0.04 42.85 0.02
Madagascar 2010 C 23.64 48.55 94.08 100.00
Malawi 2010.2 C 37.01 34.25 91.16 100.00
Malaysia 2009 I 399.76 0 33.32 0.00
Maldives 2004 C 176.47 0.14 58.11 0.49
Mali 2010 C 46.32 16.45 100 13.50
Marshall	Islands 1999 C n/a n/a n/a
Mauritania 2008 C 84.37 6.79 79.34 96.44
Mexico 2012 C 336.59 0.23 40.99 0.08
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Country Survey year Inc/Con Mean ($) Pov. gap (1.25$) % Pov. gap ($13) % Marginal tax rate
Micronesia,	Fed.	Sts.	
–	urban
2000 I 142.46 16.32 71.31 21.39
Moldova,	Rep. 2011 C 191.28 0.03 54.01 0.12
Mongolia 2007.5 C n/a n/a n/a
Montenegro 2011 C 291.1 0.08 35.22 0.09
Morocco 2007 C 160.43 0.55 63.86 1.19
Mozambique 2008.6 C 45.59 25.84 89.31 100.00
Namibia 2009.5 C 162.68 5.74 70.51 4.74
Nepal 2010.2 C 69.31 5.21 82.49 100.00
Nicaragua 2009 C 167.65 2.93 62.83 5.39
Niger 2011 C 51.98 10.42 86.9 100.00
Nigeria 2009.8 C 42.03 27.46 89.38 100.00
Pakistan 2010.5 C 73.26 1.94 81.73 72.50
Panama 2012 I 421.48 1.28 35.6 0.29
Papua	New	Guinea 1996 C 86.56 12.28 80.18 57.02
Paraguay 2012 I 329.22 0.96 40.75 0.38
Peru 2012 I 322.04 0.78 39.62 0.36
Philippines 2012 C 103.18 4.02 75 35.33
Poland 2011 C 374.06 0 25.56 0.00
Romania 2012 C 215.85 0 47.29 0.00
Russian	Federation 2009 C 444.8 0.01 24.26 0.00
Rwanda 2010.8 C 50.3 26.53 100 20.05
Senegal 2011 C 67.97 11.08 82.99 100.00
Serbia 2010 C 303.08 0 32.65 0.00
Seychelles 2006.5 C 465.8 0.07 44.27 0.01
Sierra	Leone 2011 C 44.35 19.24 88.8 100.00
Slovak	Republic 2011 I 702.93 0.19 4.85 0.02
Slovenia 2011 I 918.2 0 1.27 0.00
South	Africa 2010.7 C 319.6 1.19 55.71 0.31
Sri	Lanka 2009.5 C 117.66 0.65 71.79 4.04
St.	Lucia 1995 I 98.52 7.2 76.09 68.85
Sudan 2009 C 81.58 5.46 79.39 100.00
Suriname 1999 I 186.13 5.9 62.03 6.23
Swaziland 2009.5 C 82.44 15.22 80.49 100.00
Syrian	Arab	Republic 2004 C 135.38 0.2 67.38 1.19
São	Tomé	and	Principe 2010 C 51.39 13.94 100 10.31
Tajikistan 2009.1 C 94.83 1.36 76.1 100.00
Tanzania 2011.8 C 55.91 12.98 86.17 100.00
Thailand 2010 C 228.19 0.04 50.26 0.05
Timor-Leste 2007 C 55.63 8.14 100 5.56
Togo 2011 C 53.76 22.52 86.43 100.00
Trinidad	and	Tobago 1992 I 186.26 1.05 57.16 2.37
52 Financing the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on PovCal and World Bank World Development Indicators. Poverty data released by World Bank in October 2014.
Note:  Figures for Angola, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Morocco and Yemen have changed once compared to Ravallion (2009) even though there is no more 
updated survey: latest data on Povcal (October 2014) on poverty gap and mean income differ from Ravallion (2009). 
Country Survey year Inc/Con Mean ($) Pov. gap (1.25$) % Pov. gap ($13) % Marginal tax rate
Tunisia 2010.4 C 228.04 0.2 48.05 0.34
Turkey 2011 C 344.16 0 34.01 0.00
Turkmenistan 1998 C 83.52 6.97 79.36 100.00
Uganda 2012.5 C 70.79 11.96 82.91 100.00
Ukraine 2010 C 320.13 0 27.56 0.00
Uruguay 2012 I 489.53 0.09 22.86 0.02
Uzbekistan 2003 C n/a n/a n/a
Venezuela,	RB 2006 I 219.19 3.74 53.04 4.24
Vietnam 2012 C 154.78 0.55 62.78 2.75
West	Bank	and	Gaza 2009 C 304.1 0.01 35.87 0.01
Yemen,	Rep. 2005 C 93.94 1.87 77.44 15.02
Zambia 2010 C 38.96 41.78 91.21 100.00
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1 See e.g. UN-HLP, 2013; UN-OWG, 2014; UN-ICESDF, 2014; 
Calderón et al., 2014; and ERD, 2015 (forthcoming).
2 Assumes nominal growth of GDP of 5% for developing countries on 
average. The steady-state level of debt/GDP of 60% is consistent with 
the Maastricht criterion used for European countries.
3 Information about MAMS can be found at http://econ.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentM
DK:21403964~menuPK:4800417~pagePK:64165401~piPK:6416502
6~theSitePK:476883,00.html.
4 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/world/asia/poor-sanitation-in-
india-may-afflict-well-fed-children-with-malnutrition.html?
5 Guarantees for Development, OECD, March 2014. http://www.
oecd.org/dac/externalfinancingfordevelopment/documentupload/
GURANTEES%20report%20FOUR%20PAGER%20Final%20
10%20Mar%2014.pdf
6 Using coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by mean).
7 We use OOFs as a proxy for official flows beyond ODA focused on 
private sector and catalytic financing as such flows are commonly 
provided through the private-sector oriented arms of the development 
finance institutions and use catalytic instruments. 
 
Data on OOFs was accessed from the OECD’s DAC table 2b; it is 
important to note that this data set is incomplete as not all relevant 
agencies from OECD countries report their OOFs to the OECD 
and these figures also don’t reflect multilateral OOFs that could be 
attributed to the bilateral agencies funding them; as a result the OOFs, 
index scores should be viewed with some caution.
8 Since 1987, when the distinction between LMIC and UMIC was 
introduced, several countries moved up or down each year. Before 
2000, 50% of the countries changing their income category were 
moving down; as a consequence of stronger growth performance, this 
share fell to 15% in the 2000s.
9 This figure excludes Kenya, which reached the LMIC threshold in late 
September 2014 (see FT, 2014).
10 Since 1987 when the distinction between LMIC and UMIC was 
introduced, several countries have moved up or down each year. 
Before 2000 50% of the countries changing their income category 
were moving down; as a consequence of stronger growth performance, 
this share fell to 15% in the 2000s.
11  See Sumner, 2012; Ravallion, 2012; Alonso, Glennie and Sumner, 
2014; Kenny, 2014; Sumner and Tezanos Vázquez, 2014, among 
others.
12 70% for Ghana in 2011 – price levels had not been updated since 
1993 – and 89% for Nigeria in 2013, with prices still based on 1990 
figures.
13 The mix between grants and concessional loans is determined by the 
risk of debt distress of the country (IMF and WB, 2012).
14 These trends are consistent with the findings of the literature so far. 
First, tax revenues have been found to be positively associated with 
rising per capita income (Gupta, 2007; Drummond, 2012; Moore, 
2013); and most of the literature finds aid flows from traditional 
donors being negatively correlated to per capita income (Hoeffler 
and Outram, 2008; Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2007; Berthélemy 
and Tichit, 2002; Clist, 2011). As per Figure 4, there is a positive 
relationship between income per capita level and FDI/GDP ratio, but 
the literature has identified mixed evidence so far (see Walsh and Yu 
(2010) and Asiedu (2002) for Sub-Saharan countries).
15 Fragile countries refers here to the World Bank Harmonized List of 
Fragile Situations FY / 14 (World Bank, 2014b).
16  13.8 % of GDP average for fragile countries, 8% for non-fragile 
countries.
17 8% of GDP average for fragile countries, 3.9% for non-fragile 
countries.
18 The other exception is the distribution of tax ratios according to 
income classification and HDI.
19 Ravallion (2009) estimates that the marginal tax rate would be 100% 
(so no capacity for redistribution) for an annual income below  
$2,000 PPP; for income greater than $4,000 PPP the marginal tax 
ratio becomes small (1%).
20 Negotiations have recently accelerated, and in May 2014 delegates 
finally agreed on procedures to operationalise the Green Climate Fund 
after stalled negotiations.
21 Some argue there is no substantial evidence that the greening of 
economies inhibits either wealth creation or employment opportunities 
(UNEP, 2011). A green investment scenario of 2% of global GDP 
delivers long-term growth over 2011-2050 that is at least as high 
as an optimistic business-as-usual case, while avoiding considerable 
downside risks such as the effects of climate change, greater water 
scarcity, and the loss of ecosystem services (UNEP, 2011, pp.23-24).
22 World Bank (2012a) argues that many capital investments for climate 
change mitigation will be recouped through subsequent savings. 
Globally, $1 spent on energy efficiency would save $2 through 
investment in new supply, with the savings being even greater in 
developing countries.
23 The Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Adaptation Fund have 
not yet done impact assessment of their projects because they are only 
at mid-term stage and because of the complexity of the task. Climate 
Investment Funds (CIF) is at the early stage of disbursement.
24 The residual 21% refers to Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation (REDD+) projects (10%), projects with multiple 
objectives (9%) and not assigned (2%).
25 On the issues related to definition and measurement of additionality 
see also Brown et al. (2010); World Bank (2012c) and Nakhooda et al. 
(2013).
26 IMF World Economic Outlook database.
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27 In the case of Uganda, for example, it has not used its IDA allocation 
entirely, but was instead preparing for Eurobond issuance. Ghana, 
which issued such bonds in 2013, has chosen to delay IDA and African 
Development Fund credits. In the case of IBRD-eligible countries, 
as country borrowing limits are not published, it is hard to establish 
where they, as against political lack of demand or insufficient project 
processing capacity, are binding.
28 $16.6 billion, including the additional $2.5 billion committed and 
scheduled, but not yet paid, under the recent five-year capital increase 
window. $14 billion was paid in as of 30 June 30 2014 (WB Treasury 
website).
29 A variety of technical proposals (Kharas, 2012; Roodman, 2014; 
OECD DAC, 2013) exists for such a change. The current definition 
is problematic both because of the fixed 10% discounting method 
used and because of its arbitrary threshold of a minimum 25% grant 
element, encouraging the hardest possible loan terms that just pass 
that arbitrary test. Recognising the grant element alone removes this 
bias, regardless of the discount rate adopted.
30 The European Commission’s state aid rules, for example, assess 
guarantees as an effective upfront subsidy worth 10%-20% of the 
nominal amounts covered, depending on risk category. Current DAC 
technical proposals lean towards making guarantees a memo item 
separate from ODA.
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